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THE BITUM NOUS COAL CONSERVATION ACT OF 1935
THE Guffey Coal Bill,' providing for regulation of the bituminous coal in-
dustry,2 was enacted by Congress at the close of its last sessqion in order to
alleviate some of the difficulties which have beset the industry since the World
War. In spite of natural advantages unsurpassed anywhere in the world,3 the
1. T Brru ous COAL CONSERVATiON Acr or 1935, P. L. No. 402, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Aug. 30, 1935).
2. Unless specifically indicated to the contrary, the word, "coal," whenever used in
this study, shall be taken to refer to bituminous coal. The problems of the anthracite
coal industry are very much different from those of the bituminous coal industry, and
are foreign to this comment. See Humrr, WnAT TIE COAL Com.ossxo, FoTnm (1925)
Part IL
3. Of the total world production of 1,537 million tons in 1929, 609 million tons (535
million tons of bituminous and the remainder anthracite) or about 40 per cent of the
total were produced in the United States. It has been estimated that more than half of
the total coal reserves of the world are located within the United States. NArTo:-,%r Iunus-
o, CONvFERENc BoARD, THE Coza:xrrrEx Posrno, or Co. n; TuE Urnm STATEs
(1931) 7-9.
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industry has been in a chronic state of turmoil and disorder. The root of
the difficulty is that the capacity of the industry to produce has long been
in excess of actual demand. As a result, a large potential oversupply
has continually threatened the stability of the market for coal. This con-
dition has been brought about through a number of factors. Since the de-
mand for coal is seasonal and it is impracticable effectively to store such a
bulky product, productive facilities developed to meet the peak demand of win-
ter become a source of disturbing surplus during the slack period.4 Other
factors, less inherent than the seasonal demand for coal, have lifted capacity to
produce far above even winter consumption. During the period of railroad ex-
pansion, the railroads, induced by the promise of lucrative freight yields, en-
couraged operators to tap areas distant from centers of consumption, thus bring.
ing into production much acreage unwarranted except from the point of vleiv
of the railroads.5 In order to meet the heavy property taxes imposed upon
coal lands based upon the value of the underlying coals, many proprietors have
deemed it expedient to open new mines or push production in those already
established, notwithstanding unfavorable conditions in the coal market.0 The
rule of the Interstate Commerce Commission giving priority in car service, in
times of railroad car shortage, on the basis of physical capacity of mines to
produce, rather than their commercial ability to sell, has encouraged the main-
tenance of excessive productive facilities by making that practice profitable in
periods of shortage.7 The advance of technology in mining has also tended to
increase the disparity between capacity and consumption.8  Finally, the
tremendous expansion of all industry since the Civil War, notably during the
World War when production was stimulated artificially, gave rise to a propor-
tionate growth in the productive facilities of the coal mines to meet the in-
creased demand.9 But, as increased efficiency in the utilization of coal10 and
4. In normal years the production during the colder months of the year is greater by
more than 50 per cent than that of the summer months. See chart, VAN KLEEOx, Minnm
AND MANAGEMENT (1934) 184.
5. See GALLOWAY, INDUSTRIAL PLANNING UNDER CODES (1935) 163; MoRus, Tnz
PLIGHT OF THE COAL MINER (1934) 4.
6. See REPORT, NATIONAL REsources BOARD (1934) 426. Such hurried, wasteful mining
not only has demoralized marketing of coal, but has also hindered the development of
a considered policy of conservation.
7. See NATIONAL INDusTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 266; RraRT
OF TE UNITED STATES COAL COMMXISSION (1925) Part I, 234.
8. In 1890 each miner produced, on the average, 2.56 tons of coal per day. This output
per man had increased to 5.3 tons in 1931. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFEREN1M
BOARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 243; MoRIus, op. cit. jupra note 5, at 23; 38 COAL Ao
59 (1933).
9. The national production of bituminous coal increased from less than 17,500,000 tons
in 1870 to nearly 569,000,000 tons in 1920. See GALLOWAY, op. cit. sipra note 5, at 162.
10. The reduction in the consumption of coal due to increasing economy in its use
is very large. While 6.6 pounds of coal were needed in 1902 to produce one kilowatt
hour of electrical energy, in 1919 only 3.2 pounds were necessary, and in 1930, 1.62 pounds
were sufficient. In the field of manufacturing, records indicate economies as high as 17
per cent in the short period from 1923 to 1930. Traffic ton miles per ton of fuel on rail-
roads have increased 26 per cent from 1917 to 1929. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CoNFERucN
BOARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 87, 95, 123.
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competition with other forms of energy11 lessened the demand for coal, there
was not a corresponding decrease in the capacity of the mines 2
Despite the fact that for the industry as a whole it would have been desirable
to reduce production, it was to the advantage of each operator to produce to
capacity, for thereby he could distribute his fixed overhead costs more widely.
Accordingly, each operator endeavored to market as much coal as his mine could
produce. The fact that the demand for coal was less than the capacity of the
industry to produce alone might have sufficed to lead to ruthless competition
between operators. But added to that was the fact that the demand for coal
is relatively inelastic,13 and consumers of bituminous coal are large and power-
ful and thereby able virtually to dictate the terms of sale to comparatively
small and widely scattered mines.' 4 The resultant competition among operators
for the restricted market led to consignment of unordered coal, sales of "dis-
tress coal" at ridiculously low prices,15 "pyramiding" of sales,' 0 and other
similarly destructive practices, not the least destructive of which was the sale
of coal at less than the cost of production, a policy deemed expedient when its
purpose was to prevent the tremendous depreciation loss attendant upon shut-
ting down a mine completely."
11. In 1913, 72.7 per cent of the total energy produced in the United States was sup-
plied by bituminous coal. The failure of coal to maintain its relative standing since that
time is one of the causes of the present difficulty in the industry. Although the total pro-
duction of energy has increased 34 per cent from 1913 to 1930, this increase came from
other sources than coal. Coal accounted for only 55.7 per cent of the energy production
in 1930, and has continued to drop even further during the depression. See Moms, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 9; Coal Industry Widens Battle Front in War Against Competitior.
(1933) 38 CoAL AcE 35.
12. In 1918 the capacity of the industry was 717,000,000 tons and the actual produc-
tion, 579,000,000 tons. In 1923 capacity had risen to 970,000,000 tons although produc-
tion was only 519,000,000 tons. While production figures hovered around the 1923 level
until 1929 and then dropped to 435,000,000 tons in 1930 and 305,000,00 tons in 1932,
capacity to produce remained from 40 to 50 per cent above production. See Mon=s, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 1.
13. Since the demand for energy is fixed by the needs of industry, and the cost of
energy is a very small percentage of the total cost of the product in which it is used,
a decrease in the price of coal only slightly increases the demand for it. See Hamiton,
The Plight of Soft Coal (1928) 126 NATION 367.
14. The large number of independent producers of coal scattered over a wide area made
co-operation among them practically impossible. In 1923 there were 6,227 companies
operating 9,331 mines, and while the number was reduced somewhat by 1932, it was still
unwieldy. See GALLowAY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 163.
15. Small-sized screenings, which can be sold only as steam coal, are a necessary by-
product to the recovery of domestic lump coal, and they often become a drug on the
market. It is reported that steam coal has, on occasion, been sold for as little as fifteen
cents per ton. See Mopms, op cit. supra note 5, at 7, 156.
16. Producers often authorized several persons to sell the same coal, and as a result
the product of one mine had to compete not only against coal from other mines and
other fields, but even against itself. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 28S U. S.
344, 363 (1933).
17. Losses accruing upon the dosing of a mine from deterioration of coal at the facL-,
the rotting of timbers, and the flooding of mines, are far greater than depreciation loses
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But of even greater importance than the above trade practices was wage
cutting, resorted to by operators as a means of advancing their competitive
positions. Since wages comprise approximately 65 per cent of the cost of pro-
duction,18 operators could thereby effectuate substantial reductions in price.
But, as more and more producers adopted the practice, their comparative ad-
vantage was lessened, and the growing resistance of the miners to that policy
made industrial conflict inevitable. Thus, as a result of the prevalence of wage
cutting in the southern, traditionally non-union fields, union operators of the
northern fields not only vigorously resisted demands for wage increases, but
also were compelled to seek to offset that competitive factor by similar reduc-
tions in wages. The effect has been strikes in both fields: those in the north,
to maintain union wage rates,19 and those in the south, resulting from the
attempts of union organizers to unionize all mines and thus remove the
threat of competitive wage cutting.2 0 The costs of these strikes have been
hardship, wage losses and violation of civil liberties to miners, profit
and capital losses to producers and investors, and shortages and high prices
to consumers. Interstate commerce in coal necessarily has been seriously
obstructed, 21 and marked shifts in production have come about as non-union
fields won markets lost to the union fields as the result of strikes.22
Under ideal competitive conditions, according to classical theory, excessive
capacity in an industry should not long exist; for, under free competition, in-
suffered when production units close in other branches of industry. See Satucit, CoA
Xn=-_o CosTS (1922) 36, 37.
18. See HUNT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 97.
19. Co-operation between operators and miners has had the longest traditiou In the
'Central Competitive Field, including Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. The first
Interstate Joint Conference was organized as early as 1886, and from 1898 became an
.established institution for co-operation between the United Mine Workers of America
and the operators of that field. Breaks occurred in these conferences at intervals of three
or four years, and the failure to come to an agreement resulted in nation-wide strikesi In
1919 and 1922. The strike of 1927, caused by the refusal of the operators to extend the
Jacksonville Agreement of 1924, and in which an attempt was made to unionize the
southern fields, was a failure, and seriously set back the union even in the Central Com-
petitive Field. SUFERN, Tnz COAL Mn;ERs' STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTlAL STATUS (1926)
73-108; MANSFIELD, THE LAXE CARGO COAL RATE CONTROVERSY (1932) 35.
20. The famous strike in Harlan County, Kentucky, in the spring of 1931 was caused
by the attempt to revive the union in that district so as to end the sharp wage cuts.
N. Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1931, at 3, col. 1. See also Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U. S. 229 (1917); International Organization, U. M. W. A. v. Red Jacket Consol.
Coal & Coke Co., 18 F. (2d): 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) (both cases involving labor diffi-
culties arising from attempts to unionize the West Virginia fields).
21. Since the strikes of 1919 and 1922 were nation-wide and resulted in shortage of
coal over the entire country, it necessarily follows that interstate commerce was seriously
affected. See HUNT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 31.
22. In 1922 non-union fields accounted for but 22 per cent of national production.
By 1930, because of the advantages derived from greater flexibility in labor costs and from
absence* of strikes such as those which harrassed the union mines and broke the control
of the United Mine Workers of America, non-union fields increased their production to
80 per cent of the national output. See MORRIS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 14.
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efficient, high-cost mines would dose, submarginal labor, lured by promise of
higher return elsewhere, would depart, capital would flow into more profitable
industries, and thus there would be achieved a more normal balance between
productive capacity and consumption. But actual competition in coal, far
from ideal and strongly influenced by factors other than economic conditions in
coal, has not had such regulative effect. Mobility of labor, essential to the
proper functioning of the competitive scheme, is peculiarly lacking in bituminous
coal.P Since miners are ill-fitted for any other type of work and are usually
colonized about the mines far from centers of population, they have found it
very difficult to find work in other industries and consequently have a strong
interest in preventing competition from reducing excess capacity and thereby
causing permanent unemployment. This is illustrated in the fixing of wage
scales in the Central Competitive Field, where the United Mine Workers of
America have permitted the application of the principle of "competitive
equality," making compensation in wage rates for economic disadvantages of
particular mines and thereby rendering ineffective the regulative force of com-
petition. 24 Since railroads dependent upon coal traffic for revenue also have an
interest in keeping the mines they serve in production, freight rates are not
always based upon the cost of transportation service, but often are lowered to
permit fields distant from markets to compete successfully with closer fields.P
Moreover, captive mines,2 6 which account for more than one-fifth of national
23. Labor supply as a factor of production throughout industry is far too immobile to
bring about very great readjustments in competitive activity, but this statement applies
with particular force to coal miners. See MoIus, op. cit. supra note 5, ch. 4.
24. See Luam, A.nERS' WAGES AND T3E COST OF COAL (1924) 289, where the author
says: "In so far as the wages system provides relatively lower wage rates for diadvan-
tageously located and thin-vein properties it makes possble the operation of mines which
have no economic justification."
25. The importance of freight rates in the competition between districts is shovn with
particular clarity in the controversy between the northern and southern operators of the
Appalachian field over the freight differentials to the lake ports. The competition to
supply the lake traffic is vigorous; for, since the coal must move to the northwest during
the summer while the lakes are open, the operators who win that traffic are assured of rela-
tive continuity of production. The southern railroads are very anxious to have the largest
possible share of this lucrative trafflic go to the southern fields; for a very high propor-
tion of the business of the southern carriers consists of the transportation of coal. Although
the distance from the Pennsylvania and Ohio fields to the lakes averages from 160 to 20
miles while that of the West Virginia and Kentucky fields averages from 360 to 4GO
miles, before railroad rates were placed under the control of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the railroads fixed the differential between northern and southern districts at
only 9 cents a ton. The northern operators appealed to the Commission for relief, and in
1912 the Commission increased the advantage of the northern group to 19 cents, in 1917,
to 25 cents, and in 1927 to 45 cents. A year later the carriers agreed on the differential
of 35 cents, which the northern operators have since been attempting to increase. Sea
United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U. S. 812 (1929); Bl. sFn , THm L.= Canco Co.%r
RATE Coxraov sy (1932); and Comment (1931) 40 YA= L. J. 600.
26. Captive mines are those which are owned by users of coal, such users in the main
being large electric utilities, railroads, and steel mills. Such mines accounted for 20.21 par
cent of national bituminous tonnage in 1932. GALLOWAy, op. cit. supra note 5, at 169.
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production, are almost totally immune from competitive conditions in coal.
Their policies are dictated by 'the needs of particular railroads, generation
plants, and steel mills, and they tend to remain in production regardless of the
market situation in coal 2 7  Finally, bankruptcies cannot be relied upon to re-
duce excess capacity, for their effect in that respect is frequently nullified, the
new owners continuing to produce with overhead costs sharply curtailed. 28
The failure of competition in coal to cure the fundamental difficulty, over-
development, has had serious consequences. The immediate effects of the dis-
organization of the industry resulting from the constant threat of oversupply
have been great hardships to miners29 and producers,30 and frequent disruptions
of the free flow of coal. Of greater importance to future generations is the
tremendous waste of a valuable natural resource,3 1 whose known supply is far
from inexhaustible,32 resulting from the emphasis upon speed in the recovery
of coal which competition has promoted.
But even though it wa manifest that unbridled competition in the coal in-
dustry not only could not solve its problems, but served to aggravate them, the
government, previous to 1933, maintained a hands-off policym except in
27. Due to the large amount of capital the owners of captive mines have invested in
them and their desire for economic independence and isolation from labor difficulties over
which they have no control, owners of such mines are likely to keep them in production
even though operation is not justified by immediate considerations of efficiency.
28. See HAMILTON AND WRIGHT, TnE CASE OF Bn-uznxous CoAL (1925) 188.
29. The number of working days per year for miners throughout the country ranged
from 249 in 1918 to 142 in 1922, with the average from 1913 to 1929 about 200, or less
thaq 70 per cent of the working year. Although the base daily wage rate which prevailed
throughout the unionized portions of the industry from 1920 to 1927 was $7.50, in 1921
the median wage for the union workers was $1,425 per year, while that for the non-union
miners was $1,290. By 1931, due to a decrease in the daily wage rate to $4.82 and the loss
of working time, annual average income of workers had dropped to $811, and by 1933
had decreased to $685. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CoNFERENcE BOARD, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 237; MORRIS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 154-155; N. Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1935, at 2, col. S.
30. Treasury Statistics of Income indicate that the deficits of companies producing 46
per cent of the total output exceeded the income of the Companies making a profit, so that
the industry as a whole reported a net loss even during the boom year of 1929. REroRT,
NATIONAL REsouRcEs BOARD (1934) 400.
31. About 35 per cent of the coal in a seam is never recovered, and more than half that
coal which is left in the ground represents waste which could be avoided If careful mining
technique were used. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COAL COmssIoi (1925) Part I,
188.
32. While it is true that the reserves of lignite and low-grade bituminous are enormous,
the exhaustion of the best bituminous coals is going on at a rate which makes their con-
servation a serious national problem. The Pittsburgh bed in Pennsylvania and the highest
grade gas and metallurgical coals of Kentucky and West Virginia will last but three genera-
tions. REPORT, NATIONAL RESOURCES BOARD (1934) 401.
33. Some degree of control over freight rates and distribution of coal cars to mines,
however, has .been exercised through the Interstate Commerce Commission. The federal
government has also kept in contact with the technical aspects of the coal industry through
the Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines, and with working conditions through the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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emergencies.3 4  Thus, while numerous investigations into the industry were
conducted during this period2 5 and many measures were introduced into Con-
gress proposing federal control over the industry,30 all proposals for regulation
prior to 1933 were rejected by Congress. In 1933, however, Congress enacted
34. During the World War and the turbulent condition of the coal industry accompany-
ing the strikes of 1919 and 1922, the federal government established railroad car suvice
priorities, regulated the distribution of coal, and fixed prices. A commission appointed by
President Wilson negotiated the settlement of the strike of 1919. See H. R. Doc. No. 837
65th Cong., 2nd Sess., Ser. No. 7426 (1918) (Preliminary report by Food and Fuel Ad-
ministrations on organization, conservation, production stimulation, and regulation of
prices); Lmsna, PSiCEs OF Co.L AN Co E (1919); Rrp. U. S. Bn'uzTrous COAL Coax-
mussioz (1920) (on settlement of strike of 1919); RFP. U. S. FrDEnAL FuEL Dsrmuron
(1923) (risum6 of control of distribution and prices as result of 1922 strike); Huz,', op.
cit. supra note 2, at 77-89 (summary of regulation by federal government from 1917 to
1923).
The strikes of 1919 and 1922 resulted in such shortage of coal that several states enacted
statutes providing for the tempoiary fixing of prices and control of distribution of that
commodity. N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) 2743; R. I. Laws 1923, c. 421; and Ece
American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Food Commisson of Indiana, 268 Fed. 563
(D. Ind. 1920).
35. H. R. REP. No. 3916, 57th Cong., 2nd Sees., Ser. No. 4415 (1903) (Report by the
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries on the reasons for scarcity of coal);
SEN. Doc. No. 450, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 5265 (1903) (Report of the Interstate
Commerce Commission of investigation into subject of railroad dicrimination and mo-
nopolies in coal and oil); Sasi. Doc. No. 50, 65th Cong., 1st Ses., Ser. No. 7257 (1917)
(Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the anthracite and bituminous coal situation);
Sssi. Doc. No. 171, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., Ser. No. 7987 (1922) (Report of U. S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics on conditions in the bituminous coal fields); Smin. Doc. No. 207, 67th
Cong., 2nd Sess., Ser. No. 7982 (1922) (Report of the Federal Trade Commis on on invest-
ment and profit in soft coal mining covering the period 1916-1921); Smi. Doc. No. 195,
6Sth Cong., 2nd Sess., Ser. No. 8402 (1925) (U. S. Coal Commisson Report); H. R. Doc.
No. 847, 62nd Cong., 2nd Ses., Ser. No. 6261 (1912) (Report by Bureau of Labor on
miners' strike in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania 1910-1911); H. R. Doc. No. 1630,
63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., Ser. No. 6889 (1915) (Report by the Committee on Mines and
Mining on the Colorado Strike of 1913-1914); Smi. Doc. No. 209, 67th Cong., 2nd Ses.,
Ser. No. 7988 (1922) (Statement, by the U. S. Department of Commerce relative to the
production and prices of bituminous coal and the action of government agencies to end the
strike) ; and Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 105, 70th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1928) (Investigation of conditions in the coal fields of Pennsylvani, West
Virginia, and Ohio during the strike of 1927).
36. See Sca. REP. No. 55, 67th Cong., 1st Ses., Sex. No. 7918 (1921) (Report of
Committee on Interstate Commerce recommending passage of the "Coal Industry Stabiliza-
tion Act"); SEN. REP. No. 812, 69th Cong., 1st Sss., Ser. No. 8526 (1926) (Report of
Committee on Education and Labor recommending pas-cage of bill drawn up pursuant to
report of the Coal Commission); Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on Coal Legislation, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); Hearings before Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce on Sen. 4490, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1929) (Bill to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce in bituminous coal, provide for consolidations, mergers,
co-operative marketing, and collective bargaining, require the licensing of corporations pro-
ducing and shipping coal in interstate commerce, and to create a Bituminous Coal Com-
mission) ; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Mines and Min ng on Sen.
2935, 72nd Cong., Ist Sees. (1932) (Bill similar to one immediately preceding).
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the N.I.R.A. to promote recovery throughout all industry. The regulations
thus set up were applicable as well to the coal industry as to all others.
The Bituminous Coal Code formulated under the N.I.R.A. was not intended
to remedy the fundamental maladjustments in coal, but simply to mitigate the
more serious symptoms by prohibiting destructive competitive practices, giving
workers the right to bargain collectively, 7 and fixing hours of labor, wage rates,
and prices for coal through co-operative action. In spite of numerous dif-
ficulties encountered in the formulation and administration of the Code,88 the
coal industry as a whole assumed a more healthy aspect. Relations between
operators and miners became less strained, employment increased, and wages
reached higher levels, thereby giving miners a standard of living somewhat above
mere subsistence.3 9 In the main, both operators and miners expressed satisfac-
tion with the Code, and the operators urged its extension beyond the two year
period of the Recovery Act.40
Although the recovery of the industry was substantial, in the later stages of
control under the Code, evasions of the price provisions established became
sufficiently widespread to threaten the entire code structure. 41 Since no pro-
vision had been made to remove the fundamental cause of the disorder in coal-
overdevelopment-production from surplus capacity pressed upon the market,
and the code authorities found it increasingly difficult to maintain the minimum
price level. As it became apparent that the enforcement machinery of the Code
was wholly inadequate for the task assigned to it, confidence in the Code waned,
and there developed a strong demand for more effective regulation to prevent
the industry from lapsing into its former state of disorder.
Against that background, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 (the
Guffey Bill) strongly supported by the United Mine Workers, 42 was introduced
into the Senate in January, 1935. The decision of the Supreme Court in
37. This provision of the Code was responsible for a remarkable renaissance of the
United Mine Workers of America. Within 14 months of the adoption of the Code, the
control of the Union increased from less than 40% of the industry to over 957. Hearings
before a Sub-committee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on Sen. 1417, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 14.
38. Twenty-seven drafts of codes were submitted for approval by as many groups of
operators, before an agreement was reached. See N. Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1933, at 4, col. 3; Id.
Sept 16, 1933, at 1, col. 8; id. Sept. 19, 1933, at 1, col. 1; id. Sept. 20, 1933, at 20, col, 1.
For a summary of the perplexities, procedural crises, and conflicts in interpretation under
the Bituminous Coal Code, see LYoN, TaE NATIONAL R1covERY AmImsnTATION (1935) 431,
39. See N. Y. Times, March 30, 1934, at 1, col. 2; id. Dec. 30, 1934, at VIII, 2, col. 4;
id. Sept. 23, 1935, at 2, col. 3.
40. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1934, at 1, col. 6.
41. For some indication of the difficulty encountered in maintaining prices under the
Bituminous Code, see N. Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1934, at 1, col. 5; id. Sept. 4, 1934, at 1, col. 3;
id. Dec. 21, 1934, at 2, col. 1; and id. Jan. 5, 1935, at 5, col. 1. For a more comprehensive
treatment of the situation in bituminous coal during the period of National Recovery, eo
GALLowAY, op. cit. supra note 5, ch. 8.
42. The Bill was actually drafted by counsel of the United Mine Workers of America,
In striking contrast to their reluctance to adopt the Bituminous Coal Code, a majority of
operators also lent support to the Guffey Bill. See N. Y. Times, May 21, 1935, at 4, col,
4; id. May 26, 1935, at IV, 6, col. 7; id. June 2, 1935, at IV, 7, col. 3, 5.
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Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, invalidating all codes under the N.
I.R.A., made enactment of a coal bill more imperative than ever. After exten-
sive hearings before committees of both Houses,4 4 a stormy legislative career,4
and the threat of a national strike four times averted awaiting its passage,40
the Bill, substantially modified as the result of the holding in the Schcchitcr
Case concerning interstate commerce,4 7 became law late in August, to be ef-
fective for a period of four years.48
The Guffey Bill sets up a National Bituminous Coal Commission which is
to formulate a code for the industry in accordance with directions given by
Congress. Thus, the code is to prohibit enumerated unfair methods of competi-
tion,49 provide for the fixing of minimum prices on coal, permit producers to
co-operate through marketing agencies under the supervision of the Commis-
sion, and give miners the right to bargain collectively with their employers.
Twenty-three district boards of producers are to be organized under the code
to work with the Commission to carry out the provisions of the Act. These
boards, under the general supervision of the Coal Commission, are to establish
the minimum prices for the sale of coal at the mines, based upon the weighted
43. 295 U. S. 495 (May 1935).
44. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on Sen.
1417, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 19 - March 7, 1935) Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 8479, 74th Cong., 1st Se-s. (June 17-28, 1935).
45. Much of the congressional debate centered about the constitutionality of the Bill.
Even Attorney General Cummings doubted its legality, but he advised members of the
House to pass it and allow the courts to decide the question of its validity. N. Y. Times,
July 6, 1935, at 2, col. 4. In a letter over which much discussion has raged, President
Roosevelt wrote to the chairman of the subcommittee in charge of the Coal Bill: "I hop-
your committee will not permit doubts as to the constitutionality, however reasonable, to
block the suggested legislation," since a decision on the legal points at issue "would be
helpful as indicating, with increasing clarity, the constitutional limits within which this
Government must operate." N. Y. Times, July 7, 1935, at 1, col. 8. For editorial comment
see 120 LwT. DIG. (July 20, 1935) 11.
46. After truces on March 30th, June 14th, June 29th, July 26th, and Sept. 15th, ap-
proximately 400,000 miners went out on strike from Sept. 22nd to Oct. let. See N. Y.
Times, March 31, 1935, at 1, col. 7; id. June 15, 1935, at 1, col. 6; id. June 30, 1935, at 1,
col. 6; id. July 27, 1935, at 17, col. 7; id. Sept. 16, 1935, at 4, col. 2; id. Sept. 24, at 1, col.
3; id. Sept. 27, 1935, at 1, col. 4.
47. Provisions for the control over production and the appropriation of $30D,00,000 to
purchase surplus mines for the creation of a National Bituminous Coal Reserve, which
were in the original draft of the Bill, were absent from the measure as finally enacted.
That these changes were due to the decision in the Schechter Case seems clear. See N. Y.
Times, May 28, 1935, at 17, col. 1; id. at 19, col. 6; id. June 1, 1935, at 5, col. S; Id.
June 9, 1935, at IV, 6 col S.
48. The limitation of the effective period of the Act to four years, a provision not found
in the original draft, is a meaningless compromise. The Act is intended to remedy a parma-
nent maladjustment, and can find no support in the "emergency doctrine" enunciated in
Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917).
49. Among the practices prohibited as unfair are consignment of unordered coal, -ecret
allowances, prepayment of freight, splitting of fees, rebates through brokers, and violations
of the price provisions of the code. These practices were also illegal under the Bituminous
Coal Code of the N. I. R. A. See Sec. 4 Pt. II(i) of the Coal Act.
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average of total costs of production of the preceding year in their respective
districts. To prevent destructive competition between districts in common con-
suming market areas, the district boards and the Commission are authorized,
within limits, to co-ordinate their activities. The Commission is given power
to fix maximum prices if such regulation is deemed necessary for the protec-
tion of consumers. A Labor Board is created to take jurisdiction over labor
disputes, and the office of Consumers' Counsel to represent the interests of
users of coal is also established.
The Bill does not impose direct regulation upon the coal industry.60 The
provisions of the code in which all the regulations are to be embodied apply
only to code members, and in form, at least, membership in the code, involving
subjection to its provisions and submission to the jurisdiction of the Coal Com-
mission, is voluntary. Several provisions of the Act, however, are designed to
encourage code membership. An excise tax of fifteen per cent on the sale price
at the mine is imposed upon all bituminous coal, but members of the code who
comply with its provisions, and they alone, are entitled to a drawback of ninety
per cent of that tax. Under the provisions of the Act, bituminous coal which
is not produced in compliance with the code may not be purchased by the
United States nor by any contractor to be used in government work. 1 More-
over, non-members are not permitted to co-operate through market agencies
such as those provided for in the code; for the restrictions of the Sherman Act
continue to apply to them in unambiguous terms. 2 And finally, non-members
of the code are expressly made subject to other acts of Congress regulating in-
dustries and their labor relationsY3
Four distinct constitutional issues are raised by the Guffey Bill: whether
Congress has improperly delegated legislative powers to the Coal Commission;
whether the Bill as a whole may be upheld under the taxing power alone;
whether, if not sustainable under the taxing power, its provisions are valid
regulations of interstate commerce; and finally, whether the provisions of the
Act are so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be invalid under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.64
60. For a possible exception to this statement, see infra note $3.
S1. This boycott method, applied to railroads carrying mail for the government and
mills supplying steel for public works, can be very effective. See 141 CoznmxcIAL AND
Fnxcmr. CmiOMcLE 2793, 2794 (Nov. 2, 1935).
52. See Sec. 13 of the Bituminous Coal Act.
53. More specifically: THE NATIONAL LABOR REATioNs ACT (The Wagner Labor DIs-
putes Act), P. L. No. 198, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). Since the Guffey Coal Bill Imposes
collective bargaining upon code members and the Wagner Labor Disputes Bill imposes
similar regulation upon all remaining producers who "affect commerce," the element of
volition seems confined to very narrow quarters. Not content with relying upon the Wagner
Labor Disputes Bill, Congress further provided in the Guffey Coal Bill that the employees
of all producers shall have the right of collective bargaining. This last provision may be
explained as an attempt to make collective bargaining in coal independent of the constitu-
tional validity of the Wagner Labor Disputes Bill. See Sec. 9 of the Coal Act.
54. Almost within 24 hours of the approval of the Act by the President, suit was brought
to test it in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (Carter v. Carter Coal Co.),
and ten days later it was attacked in the Federal District Court for the Western District
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There appears to be slight basis for attack of the Bill on the ground that
it involves an improper delegation of legislative power. While the actual
formulation of the code was entrusted to the Coal Commission, Congress, aware
of the recent invalidation of executive orders and codes under the N.I.RA. be-
cause it had not sufficiently prescribed the standards by which executive of-
ficers were to be guided, carefully specified in great detail the provisions and
conditions which the coal code was to contain, clearly enunciated its policy,
and laid down standards for the guidance of the Commission in the administra-
tion of the Act. Thus, the costs to be considered in arriving at the weighted
average of total costs, upon which the minimum prices are to be based, are
explicitly set forth; the procedure to be used in arriving at minimum prices is
dearly spelled out; unfair methods of competition are enumerated; and at
every turn the Commission is closely instructed both in respect to means and
end. Indeed, the real objection to the delegation of power feature of the Guffey
Bill is not a constitutional one, but rather that Congress, in its efforts to avert
the constitutional difficulty raised in the Hot Oi13 and Schechtcr 43 cases, has
so circumscribed the powers of the Commission that efficient administration of
the Act may thereby be impeded. 0
More difficult problems are raised by the tax and drawback provisions of the
Act. Tax statutes clearly enacted for other than revenue purposes have been
upheld on the ground that the Court could not consider congressional motives,"7
of Kentucky (Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn). In the latter case, the Act was upheld in its en-
tirety. U. S. L. Week, Nov. 19, 1935, at 193. But in the Carter case Justice Adlanz, in
an oral opinion delivered on Nov. 27, 1935, while upholding the taxing and price lixing pro-
visions of the Act, held invalid sections providing for regulation of wages and hours of
labor. U. S. L. Week, Dec. 3, 1935, at 233. The opinion that the labor provisions of the
Act axe "not inextricably tied into the fixing of prices" is not well founded. Since wages
comprise such a large proportion of the cost of production (65%), and since it is the labor
difficulties particularly which have continually harassed the industry, it is apparent that the
labor provisions of the Act are essential to the statutory scheme of stabilization. See irira
p. 296.
55. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (Jan. 1935); see Comment (1935) 48
Hzv. L. R . 798.
56. Cf. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1911); Hampton & Co. v. United
States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928); New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287
U. S. 12 (1932); Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge. Co., 289 U. S. 266
(1933); Comment (1933) 31 MicH. L. Ray. 786.
The argument might also be made that the provision of the Act (Sec. 4, Pt. IT, g) which
binds code members to agreements upon hours of labor and wages negotiated between two-
thirds of the employers and more than a majority of the workers is unconstitutional becaus
it improperly delegates legislative power to private individuals. This problem of the pro-
cedure by which agreements on hours and wages are reached is discus-sed infra pp. 311-312.
57. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869); McCray v. United States, 195
U. S. 27 (1904); United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919). Very recently the Court
enunciated the rule anew in these terms: "From the beginning of our government, the
courts have sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior
ends which, considered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmahers to
realize by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment. These decisions . . . rule
the present case." Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 47 (1934) (upholding a state
tax of 15 cents per pound on all butter substitutes).
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but others have been invalidated when the statute "on its face" revealed a
purpose to penalize conduct not within the purview of congressional power. 8
Such cases, however, are not necessarily controlling precedent for the Bill under
consideration. At least on its face, ihe Act does not impose a tax upon those
who do not comply with a mode of conduct suggested by Congress, but rather
levies a flat tax upon all members of the industry, and provides that a drawback
of part of the tax shall go to those operators who fulfill the conditions set forth
in the Act. It is clear that the flat tax of fifteen per cent upon all bituminous
coal produced, considered purely as an unconditional tax, would be valid.60
Under this interpretation, therefore, the question then resolves itself into
whether or not a drawback, in the nature of a subsidy by the government and
given upon conditions prescribed by Congress, may be upheld as a valid ex-
ercise of the spending power of Congress.
Congress has given its spending power a very broad interpretation, extending
subsidies on innumerable occasions to advance projects, the encouragement of
which it deemed to be for the general welfare. 60 The Supreme Court has not
yet indicated that the long-continued interpretation by Congress was unwar-
ranted by the Constitution.61 It is at-least arguable that a subsidy to encourage
the conservation of a valuable natural resource and to foster a plan for the
stabilization of an industry carried on in over half the States, employing 450,-
000 workers, and furnishing a product indispensable to our industrial economy
constitutes a spending for the general welfare. Upon that theory, the Act in its
entirety could be upheld.
This argument, however, is open to attack upon two grounds. Even as-
suming that the drawback is a subsidy, it is quite different from previous sub-
sidies granted by Congress. In former appropriations for the general welfare,
the purpose of a gift and the conditions upon it involved the use to which the
money was put. The subsidy under consideration, however, is merely a method
of enforcing a suggested mode of conduct quite apart from the expenditure of
the money by the one subsidized, and is open to the same objections as a
58. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U. S. 20 (1922); Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922).
59. That Congress may impose uniform excise taxes has long been settled. Turpin v.
Burgess, 117 U. S. 504 (1886) (excise tax on tobacco upheld). A drawback upon a tax
closely related to a revenue purpose is also valid. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (1927)
(deduction of State inheritance taxes in computing federal estate tax upheld). For examples
of drawbacks in the Customs Act and in the Revenue Act, see 46 STAT. 693 (1930), 19
U. S. C. A. § 1313 (1934) ; 20 STAT. 347 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. § 836 (1935).
60. Large sums have been spent by the federal government in the form of grants-in-aid
to the States for highway building, agricultural extension, rehabilitation of persons disabled
in industry, and for the promotion of hygiene of maternity. The expenditures of the last
two years on relief and public works have run into billions of dollars. The A. A. A. and
the Social Security Bill depend upon the spending power of Congress for their effectiveness.
See CORwn, TEE TwmGHT Or TH SuPremE COURT (1934) 149-179.
,61. The Court has been reluctant to pass upon the validity of appropriations for the
general welfare even when that question has been squarely at issue. See Smith v. ansas
City Title and Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921); Massachusetts v. Mellon, Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
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regulatory tax whose purpose is not the raising of revenue. In the second
place, while the drawback may technically be considered a subsidy, it is so
closely related to the tax imposed that it may be argued that the attempted
separation should be completely disregarded and the refusal of the right to a
drawback deemed equivalent to the imposition of a tax as a penalty. The sus-
taining of either of these arguments would bring the Guffey Bill within the
principle enunciated in the Child Labor Tax Case,6 2 and thus would make
pertinent an inquiry into whether Congress, under the guise of its taxing power,
has attempted to regulate matters exclusively within the province of the
States.63 The issue would then be shifted to a consideration of whether the
provisions of the code, compliance with which is a condition upon the right to a
drawback, would be valid as affirmative regulations under the commerce clause.
A drawback refused or a tax imposed to encourage conduct which Congress
could otherwise require under its commerce power would be quite unobjection-
able.64
The declaration of policy of the Act indicates clearly that the measure was
intended to fall within the permissible limits of congressional power over
interstate commerce and contains findings of fact to the effect that the three
types of control over the bituminous coal industry which are established, namely,
prohibition of unfair methods of competition, regulation of prices at the mines,
and the grant to workers of the right to bargain collectively (necessarily im-
posing a correlative restraint upon employers), are directly related to inter-
state commerce.6 5 These legislative findings of fact are entitled to respect and
62. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
63. If the subject matter of regulation be within congressional power, it would appear
to make no difference that the tax is not imposed to raise revenue. "The difference between
a tax and a penalty is sometimes difficult to define, and yet the consequences of the diss.
tinction in the required method of their collection often are important. Where the
sovereign enacting the law has power to impose both tax and penalty, the difference be-
tween revenue production and mere regulation may be immaterial, but not so when one
sovereign can impose a tax only, and the power of regulation rests in another." (Italics
ours) Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 33 (1922).
64. Since fines and imprisonment to enforce absolute prohibitions laid down by Congress
in the valid exercise of its power over interstate commerce are unquestionably proper, a
fortiori the less drastic method of imposing a tax or refusing a drawback is valid. The
manner in which such tax is assessed or drawback denied, however, may raise questions of
due process in procedure. This aspect of due process is discussed infra p. 312.
65. The declaration of policy of the Act states, "It is further recognized and declared
that all production of bituminous coal and distribution by the producers thereof bear upon
and directly affect its interstate commerce and render regulation of all such production and
distribution imperative for the protection of such commerce ... (and) ... that the exce~sive
facilities for the production of bituminous coal and the over-expansion of the industry have
led to practices and methods of production, distribution, and marketing of such coal that
waste such coal resources of the Nation, disorganize the interstate commerce in such coal
. ..and burden and obstruct the interstate commerce in such coal, to the end that con-
trol of such production and regulation of the prices realized by the producers thereof are
necessary to promote its interstate commerce, remove burdens and obstructions therefrom,
and protect the national public interest therein; that practices prevailing in the production
of bituminous coal directly affect its interstate commerce and require regulation for the
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should carry weight,66 particularly since they are so well confirmed by the his-
tory of the industry since the War and since the regulations imposed may be
shown to relate quite directly to interstate commerce in coal.
Decisions interpreting and applying the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which statutes declare illegal those trade practices whose ef-
fect is to restrain interstate commerce,6 7 lend support to the similar provisions
of the Guffey Bill prohibiting certain unfair methods of competition. The prac.
tices which are rendered illegal by the latter Act relate to the sale and market-
ing of coal, most of which actually moves across State lines, and are those which
have seriously disrupted interstate commerce in coal in the past. Their pro-
hibition, at least with respect to the 75 per cent of the total production of coal
moving in interstate commerce,68 may be said to constitute a valid regulation
of that commerce which clearly falls within the pattern of the cases.
Likewise, the minimum price provisions of the Act may be supported at least
with respect to the large proportion of the national production of coal which
moves in interstate commerce. The price at which that coal is sold is a
significant incident of that commerce, influencing both its amount and direc-
tion. 9 In cases arising under the Sherman Act7" and under statutes regulating
grain exchanges 7' and stockyards, 72 the Court has held that Congress, to carry
protection of that commerce, and that the right of mine workers to organize and collec-
tively bargain for wages, hours of labor, and conditions of employment should be guaran-
teed in order to prevent constant wage cutting and the establishment of disparate labor
costs detrimental to fair competition in the interstate marketing of bituminous coal, and in
order to avoid those obstructions to its interstate commerce that recur in the industrial
disputes over labor relations at the mines." Sec. 1 of the Act.
66. See Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U. S. 502 (1934).
67. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (1922); United
Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922); Federal Trade Commission
v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U. S. 483 (1922); Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co.,
278 U. S. 245 (1929).
68. Over 757 of the total production of coal is either sold across State lines or used on
interstate carriers. See Bockus, Bituminous Coal Problems (1923) 1 H-Iv. Bus. Ray. 290;
HuNr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 45; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Interstate Commerce on Sen. 1417, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 110.
69. See Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 40 (1923), ". ... The question
of price dominates trade between the States. Sales of an article which affect the country.
wide price of the article directly affect the country-wide commerce in it .. .9
70. Adyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899) (combination
among manufacturers to increase prices held illegal even though there resulted no re-
striction in the amount of pipe sold); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905)
(injunction granted against monopolistic practices by meat packers and dealers whose
effect was to increase the price of fresh meat throughout the United States). See also
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); Eastern States Lumber Asn'n v.
United States, 234 U. S. 600 (1914).
71. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923) (regulation of the Chicago
grain exchange to prevent price manipulation upheld).
72. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922); Tagg. Bros. & Moorhead v. United States,
280 U. S. 420 (1930) (upholding regulations of practices and charges In stockyards to
protect interstate commerce in livestock and meat against the fixing of arbitrary prices by
the packers).
out its policy of keeping commerce open, may prohibit or regulate activities
carried on within a single State whose most important bearing upon interstate
commerce is their effect upon the prices of goods in that commerce. Since
Congress was permitted to assume jurisdiction in those cases where the price
of goods flowing in interstate commerce was concerned, and since the policy
sought to be effectuated by Congress is entirely within its discretion,73 it would
appear to follow that Congress rather than the States may fix the prices of coal
moving in interstate commerce in order to stabilize that commerce. 4 The
argument that Congress may act to restrain price fixing and price manipula-
tion in interstate commerce but may not itself fix prices, while significant in
relation to due process of law to be considered later, has no relevance in the
discussion of the division of power between the Federal Government and the
States.
The inclusion of the small fraction of coal which does not move in interstate
commerce7 s within the congressional scheme of price control and prohibition
of unfair practices finds support in the doctrine of the Shreveport CaseY3  In
that case the principle was enunciated that where the subject matter of control
is substantially within the limits of congressional power, the power of Congress
is paramount. It may supersede State control over the minor portion, when
such uniform regulation is necessary to prevent discrimination against inter-
state commerce and is essential to the effectiveness of federal control, even
though the minor portion might, if considered apart, fall outside the scope of
federal jurisdiction. These considerations apply with equal force to the regu-
lations of interstate commerce in coal under the Guffey Bill. If coal intended
for consumption within the State of its production were immune from con-
73. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 337-338 (1904), where
the Court said, "Whether the free operation of the normal laws of competition is a wiu
and wholesome rule for trade and commerce is an economic question which this court need
not consider or determine . . . As in the judgment of Congress the public convenience
and the general welfare will be best subserved when the natural laws of competition are left
undisturbed by those engaged in interstate commerce, . . . that must be, for all, the end
of the matter . . ."
74. For cases indicating that the States may not impose such regulations, see Leme v.
Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 (1922) (State statute which sought to regulate the price
and profit on sales of wheat by farmers to local grain elevators held invalid as a violation
of the commerce clause since, in the usual course of business, most of the wheat was
shipped to other states); Balwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 (March 1935)
(prohibition under New York Milk Control Law of importation of Vermont milk which
had been purchased at a lower price than that permitted under the New York Statute held
an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce).
75. Less than 25% of the total. Since at least a small fraction of the product of most
mines does not move in interstate commerce, the number of mines none of whose product
leaves the channels of intrastate commerce must be exceedingly small See Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on Sen. 1417, 74th Cong., let
Sess. (1935) 110.
76. Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914) (upholding
order of Interstate Commerce Cornmisifon to interstate carriers to desist from charging




gressional regulation, there would result disastrous discrimination against inter-
state shipments of coal. For, with competitive practices and prices unbridled
within each State, intrastate coal would tend to be sold at much lower prices
than those fixed under the code for the coal undeniably within congressional
power. Thus, since it would be advantageous for the users of coal in each
State to exhaust the domestic supply before importing coal from other States,
State borders would tend to become effective economic barriers, seriously re-
stricting the interstate movement of coal. Moreover, past experience in the
coal industry indicates that the prevalence of unfair methods of competition and
price cutting within the isolated intrastate markets would undoubtedly result
in losses to producers, 0 The attempts of producers to recoup these intrastate
losses in their interstate sales would tend further to burden interstate com-
merce in coal. 77 Finally, limitation of federal price control and regulation of
trade practices to coal actually moving or destined to move across State lines
would raise administrative problems of great difficulty and, because of ease of
evasion, would make effective enforcement well-nigh impossible.
The collective bargaining provisions of the Act may be sustained as valid
regulations of commerce on two grounds. In the first place, they may be up-
held as a necessary means of preventing obstructions to interstate commerce
through strikes. It is settled that Congress may act to enjoin strikes whose
direct effect is to obstruct interstate commerce.78 And it may also protect that
commerce by preventing the recurrence of practices which tend to obstruct it.79
Since facts clearly substantiate the belief that wage cutting and attempts at
unionization have been important factors underlying strikes, 0 it can hardly be
maintained that the conclusion of Congress that assurance of the miners' free.
dom of collective bargaining will tend to remove those burdens upon interstate
commerce is unwarranted. Secondly, collective bargaining may be supported
as an indispensable aid to the enforcement of the price and trade practice
provisions of the Act and to the maintenance of the stability of the entire plan.
Since minimum prices are based upon the weighted average of total costs, wage
cutting in non-union districts would drive down the minimum prices fixed under
the code for those districts, were there no provision for collective bargaining.
Thus, great pressure would be placed upon operators in union districts to offset
that competitive disadvantage by evading the minimum prices established in
their districts and engaging in the prohibited trade practices. Such resumption
77. Cf. Wisconsin Rr. Commission v. C., B. & 0. Rr. Co., 257 U. S. 563 (1922) (up-
holding order of the Interstate Commerce Commission over intrastate rates requiring intra,
state traffic over the lines of an interstate carier to pay a proportionate share of the cost
of maintaining an adequate railway system) ; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1 (1934).
78. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U. S. 295 (1925);
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927); Inter.
national Organization, U. M. W. A. v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F. (2d)
839 (C. C. A, 4th, 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 536 (1927). Cf. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
U. S. 274 (1908).
79. See Swift & Company v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905); Stafford v. Wallace,
258 U. S. 495 (1922) ; Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923).
80. See REPoRT oF THE Uzrn-E STATES COAL Co ssioir (1925), Part III, 1288, 1317.
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lof fierce competition between districts would make stabilization of the industry
a goal virtually impossible of attainment.
The numerous cases which abound in dicta to the effect that mining and
manufacture are not commerce 8l have no close application to the Guffey Bill;
for they were concerned with the validity of State taxes and not the scope of
federal power, and furthermore it is not necessary that some activity be inter-
state commerce in order for it to be subject to federal regulation. It is suf-
ficient if an activity directly affects interstate commerce., 0 The very nature of
the intrastate-interstate concept makes necessary regulation by both govern-
ments where local and national commerce are involved.82 The Coal Bill makes
no attempt to control mining as such, but regulates only those incidents of
mining which Congress believes to relate directly to interstate commerce,
namely, prices, trade practices, aid labor relations. State control over the local
incidents of mining such as safety and health conditions83 and State occupa-
tion taxes upon mining, mentioned above, are not affected by the provisions of
the Guffey Bill.84
The Schechter Case, however, is a more formidable obstacle. It was held
in that case, first, that the Poultry Code was invalid because of improper delega-
tion of legislative power, and second, that the provisions of the Code, partic-
ularly the fixing of hours of labor and wages, were not regulations of interstate
commerce because the activities they sought to regulate did not affect that
commerce idirectly enough. There are significant differences, however, between
the Poultry Code and poultry situation in New York City on the one hand,
and the Guffey Bill and the coal industry on the other; and it may be argued
that these differences offer sufficient grounds to distinguish the Schechter Case.
The dealers subject to the Poultry Code were engaged entirely in intrastate
trade, processing and selling poultry within New York City after shipment
from other States had ended.s5 Their activities within that city were regulated
81. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 (1922); Oliver Iron Mlining Co. v.
Lord, 262 U. S. 172 (1923); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1927); Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932).
82. See Swift & Company v. United States, 196 U. S. 3751 400 (1905), wherein the
court said, ". . . . But we do not mean to imply that the rule which marks the point at
-which state taxation or regulation becomes permissible necessarily is beyond the scopa of
interference by Congress in cases where such interference is deemed necessary for the pro-
tection of commerce among the States . . ." See also Minnesota v. Blasus, 290 U. S. 1,
,S (1933), where it was said, "But because there is a flow of commerce which is subject
to the regulating power of the Congress, it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence
of a conflict with the exercise of that power, a state may not lay a non-discriminatory tax
upon property which, although connected with that flow as a general course of busines ,
has come to rest and has acquired a situs within the State... ")
83. For examples of safety and health regulations by States see, PMlA. STATUXE Ar.
(Purdon's, 1931) tit. 52, ch. 4; Wasr VinmnrrA CoD (1930) 623.
84. See Sec. 11 of the Act.
85. This fact alone, of course, is not condusive. See Local 167 of the International
:Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U. S. 293 (1934) (injunction decreed under
Sherman Act against a conspiracy in the local New York poultry market which was found
to obstruct interstate commerce in poultry).
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on the theory that they obstructed interstate commerce. But while it is true
that wage cutting and price cutting had demoralized the price structure in
poultry and had led to deplorable trade practices, that disorder was peculiarly
local in character, and its effects upon interstate shipments, either in direction
or amount, were quite speculative. The validity of the fixing of hours of labor
and wages really depended on the theory that increased purchasing power any-
where in the nation must necessarily promote interstate commerce, since the
country is an economic unit. Both arguments were rejected by the Court as
attempting to prove too much.86
The disorganization in the coal industry which the Guffey Bill seeks to cure,
on the other hand, is undeniably national in scope; for over 75 per cent of
the coal produced moves in interstate commerce. Price cutting, wage cutting,
and unfair methods of competition not only have disrupted interstate commerce
in coal, but the effects of those activities upon that commerce may be traced
with sufficient certainty to warrant their control under the commerce clause.87
For these reasons, the price and trade practice provisions of the Act, relating
only to the sale and marketing of coal and imposed upon producers, many of
whom are actually engaged in distributing coal in interstate commerce, may be
said to constitute a valid regulation of that commerce. And on a similar
basis the provisions of the Guffey Bill relating to hours and wages may
be distinguished from the fixing of hours of labor and minimum wages
under the Poultry Code, which the Supreme Court declared invalid as too
remote from interstate commerce. The Bill grants to workers the right to
bargain collectively and provides for the negotiation of hours of labor agree-
ments between representatives of a majority of the workers and operators pro-
ducing two-thirds of the national tonnage, to be binding upon all code mem-
bers, and provides similarly for the reaching of wage agreements within dis-
tricts. These provisions are designed not primarily for the humane purpose
of bettering the workers' living conditions as was the case with the fixing of
hours and minimum wages under the Poultry Code, and therefore do not de-
pend upon the tenuous purchasing power argument for their connection with
interstate commerce. Their purpose, rather, is to prevent the recurrence of
strikes directly obstructing interstate commerce, which the older technique of
negotiation between miners and operators, involving individual bargaining,
struggles for unionization, wage cutting, and disparate labor costs between
districts, engendered, and which Congress had reason to fear would recur un-
less provision were made for fairer and more enduring compromise between
producers and workers, and for more uniform labor costs between fields.88
86. "Activities local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because
of distant repercussions. What is near and what is distant may at times be uncertain.
There is no penumbra of uncertainty obscuring judgment here. To find immediacy or
directness here is to find it almost everywhere. If centripetal forces are to be Isolated to
the exclusion of the forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our
federal system," Mr. Justice Cardozo, concurring in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U. S. 495, 554 (May 1935).
87. See infra p. 296, and also finding of fact by Congress, supra note 65.
88. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 521 (1922) where the Court said: "Whatever
amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden
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Assuming that the provisions of the Act intended to stabilize the interstate
flow of coal are valid under the commerce clause, the question remains as to
whether those provisions impose "reasonable" restraints upon property rights
and personal liberty under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and are "reasonably calculated" to effectuate the goal of stability sought to be
attained. The two provisions of the Guffey Bill most open to attack on
grounds of due process are minimum price fixing and collective bargaining. In
two significant cases the Court has held that a seller of goods has no absolute
constitutional immunity from minimum price control 0 and that an employer
of labor may constitutionally be restrained from interfering with his employees'
right of collective bargaining.P0 Since those provisions have received constitu-
tional sanction in other situations, the issue is whether, in view of the circum-
stances of the coal industry, the public interest which stabilization may be ex-
pected to advance balances favorably against the restraints imposed upon pro-
ducers by the price control and collective bargaining features of the Act. It
may be argued from the costly results of' strikes and disorder in the coal in-
dustry, that the benefits intended to be conferred upon the public are suf-
ficiently substantial to warrant those restrictions upon individual activity. The
numerous investigations into the confusion and difficulties of the coal industry 5
the flood of bills proposed to remedy the situation, 0 and the recognition by
the Supreme Court itself in the Appalachian Coals Case0l of deplorable condi-
tions in coal show that the view of Congress that control was needed was not
without foundation .92  The conservation of a valuable natural resource which
will be fostered by such control is another strong argument in support of the
"reasonableness" of the provisions of the Act. And the mitigation of destruc-
tive trade practices and the general improvement in the coal situation during
the period of the Bituminous Coal Code under the N.I.R.A. is some indication
that the similar price fixing and collective bargaining features of the Coal Bill
are not wholly unrelated to the object of stabilization of commerce fostered by
Congress.
The provision in the Act that an hours of labor agreement negotiated be-
tween the producers of two-thirds of the national production and the repre-
the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the
comerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to con-ider and decide the fact of the
danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of
Congress in such a matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its
effect upon it are dearly non-existent."
89. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
90. Texas & New Orleans Rr. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S.
548 (1930). That case has seriously restricted the authority of Adair v. United States, 203
U. S. 161 (1908) (holding invalid a federal statute vhich made it a crime to discharge an
employee on an interstate railroad because of his member-hip in a labor union) and Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915) (state statute prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts held uncon-
stitutional). See Powell, Collective Bargaining Before the Supreme Court (1918) 33 PoL.
Scr. Q. 396; Comment (1930) 40 YAs.n L. J. 92.
91. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933). See Comment (1932)
42 YAlE L. J. 233.
92. See also HAmLON AxD WviGnT, A WAY TO OnDIn roR Brruar.nous CoAL (1928).
1935] COMMIENTS
YALE LAW JOURNAL
sentatives of a majority of the workers shall be binding upon all code mem-
bers, and a similar provision in relation to wage agreements within districts.
raises additional grounds for constitutional objection. In an analogous case
involving the validity of an ordinance which gave to owners of two-thirds
of the property on any block the power to fix building lines, the Court held the
procedure to be violative of due process.93  But the situations are readily dis-
tinguishable. In the latter case the city council did not express a policy in favor
of uniformity in building lines guided by a standard of public welfare and con-
venience, but instead delegated to property owners the power to fix building
lines according to their own decision as to what they conceived to be for the
public benefit. In the Guffey Bill, on the other hand, Congress has stated its
purpose to be the promotion of uniformity in wages and hours, to the end that
continuity of the flow of coal in interstate commerce may be fostered and
burdens upon such commerce, which have been caused in the past by disparity
of labor costs between districts, may be prevented. It leaves to negotiation
between workers and operators only the fixing of the precise level of such wages
and hours. The greater significance of uniformity in the latter case and its
closer identification with legislative policy may well justify a decision uphold-
ing the provisions of the Act under discussion. 4
The right to a drawback of ninety per cent of the tax of fifteen per cent
imposed raises a further problem of due process, relative to the method by
which a producer is denied the right to a drawback. The denial of the draw-
back by the Commission can hardly be objected to on constitutional grounds by
those producers who refuse to join the code, for if the Bill is valid in other re-
spects, this method of enforcement appears to be within the discretion of Con-
gress. 5 But as to code members who are found to have violated the pro-
visions of the code, a different question arises. The Coal Commission is au-
thorized to cancel membership in the code for violation of its provisions. Such
cancellation automatically deprives an operator of drawbacks in the future, and
it is provided that before a producer may be reinstated, he must pay the full
tax of fifteen per cent upon coal produced in the period during which the
Commission finds the violation continued. A member thus found violating the
code could argue that the refusal of the drawback and the assessment of back
taxes in effect constitute a fine or penalty. Since the imposition of this fine
and its amount are dependent upon what may be disputed and doubtful ques-
tions of fact, namely, whether or not there has been a violation and how long
it has continued, the producer might therefore claim that he is entitled to a
judicial determination of that question in the first instance, on the ground
that the determination of violations of statutes for the purpose of imposing
penalties has traditionally been a judicial function."°
93. Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137 (1912).
94. See Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526 (1917) (in which the Eubank casd
was distinguished on grounds similar to those urged in reference to the Guffey Bill, I.e.
definiteness of legislative policy).
95. If a producer refuse to join the code, there can be no dispute over the fact of
membership or violation. See also supra notes 63 and 64.
96. Violations of the Transportation Act, for example, are punished either through
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That argument, however, is far from a compelling one. The method of
securing obedience to the code provisions is the granting of a drawback upon
a tax only to members in good standingP 7 Even assuming it were the imposi-
tion of a tax, a taxpayer is not entitled to a judicial determination of the facts
upon which an assessment is basedY5  The requirement that the Coal Com-
mission hold a hearing upon the issue of violation before it may cancel a mem-
bership, and the provision for review by the Circuit Court of Appeals would
seem to afford ample protection to producers against arbitrary action. In addition,
the tax has significant practical advantages. It makes possible efficient administra-
tion of the code by the Commission by providing an effective method of in-
ducing obedience and discouraging violation.
The arguments upon constitutional issues here presented are admittedly far
from conclusive. At the present stage of the growth of constitutional doctrine,
it is a truism to state that decisions upon important questions depend ultimately
as much upon the Court's social philosophy as upon the formal doctrines which
comprise the substance of its opinions. In the last analysis, the fundamental
issue involved in the validity of the Bituminous Coal Act is not whether Con-
gress or the various States may impose regulations such as those provided in
the Act, but whether any such regulations are to be imposed upon the coal
industry;9 9 for it is clear that effective stabilization of that national industry
through control by the various States is beyond the range both of constitutional
power74 and political expedience.'10 The state of the industry previous to
federal regulation inaugurated in 1933 indicates that some sort of effective
regulation is necessary. It is not pretended, however, that a decision by the
Court upholding the Act will solve the coal problem. On the contrary, solution
will then have just begun. The Commission will still be confronted with a
task demanding rare statesmanship. In the first place, the Bill makes no pro-
vision for the control of production or the reduction of excess mine capacity,''
omissions which will make most difficult the maintenance of the price structure
and which leave untouched the fundamental cause of disorder in coal--overde-
criminal prosecutions or penalty suits, both of which are purely judicial proceedings.
SnAnrAa.w, Tnam INsRsTATE ComxcE CoanssoN (1935) v. III A. 80. See also Fh=xum,
AD ATIV PowERs ovER PERSONS AND PROPERT (1928) 205, 207.
97. If the drawback is considered in the nature of a subsidy from the government, it is
dear that a producer may sue the government for that drawback only with its permiLion
and in the manner prescribed by it. See United States v. McDougall's Administrator, 121
U. S. 89 (1887); Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60 (1905); 24 SzTA. 50S (IM57), 36
STAT. 1136 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 250 (1928).
98. The Board of Tax Appeals which finds facts relative to tax assessments, while quasi-
judicial in function, is an agency of the executive branch of the government. 43 Stmr. 336
(1924), 44 STAT. 105 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 600 (1935). See also Dx=.so;.- ADunas-
TRAVE JuSTicE AmD SuPREmEAcY or LAw (1927) 263.
99. Cf. Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes (Nov. 1935) 49 Hlv. L. Rnv. 1, 43.
100. This was a significant factor in the decision of the Federal District Court in Tway
Coal Co. v. Glenn (W. D. Ky. Nov. 14, 1935) in which the Guffey Bill was held valid.
U. S. L. Week, Nov. 19, 1935, at 193.
101. It is interesting to note that both these provisions were found in the Bill as
originally introduced. See supra note 47.
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velopment. Secondly, even if these obvious defects in the Bill were remedied,
there still would remain the difficulties and faults inherent in all plans of con-
trolled competition in an economy that is essentially unplanned. 10 2 Control
through price fixing, particularly in an industry as far flung as bituminous coal
and in which conditions vary so greatly between fields and even between mines
within the same field, is a clumsy technique of regulation,10 3 and one most
difficult to administer.10 4 Control of competition involves heavy costs to con-
sumers, rigidity in economic adjustments, and sharp conflicts of interest of
which the Commission must take cognizance.' 0° In spite of these serious
economic difficulties, however, the Bill represents a commendable working start
toward a solution, and the intricate problems of economics involved are far
better fitted for legislative discussion and compromise than for inflexible judicial
approval or rejection.
RECENT CHAIN STORE TAXES BASED ON VOLUME OF
BUSINESS
IN THE last few years, anti-chain store sentiment has found expression in
various discriminatory tax measures.1 The Supreme Court has already passed
upon the constitutionality of two types of such legislation. In Indiana Board
of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, the Court upheld an Indiana statute which
imposed on merchants a tax of a specific sum per store, graduated in amount
according to the number of stores under one management.2 In Stewart Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewis, on the other hand, it invalidated a Kentucky statute which
taxed retailers at a percentage of gross sales, the percentage rate being grad-
102. One very obvious difficulty, among the many that cannot be predicted, Is the In-
creasing threat of competition from other forms of energy, particularly oil and natural gas,
if the price of coal should rise. See supra note 11.
103. Since price is the component of numerous interrelated factors in which are merged
their mutual adjustments, stabilization of price will cause the numerous fluctuations which
have hitherto been absorbed within the price system to be reflected in changes In produc-
tion and employment.
104. For practical difficulties encountered in the administration of the British Coal
Mines Act of 1930 which provided control over production and prices through national
and district schemes and to which the Guffey bill is similar, see Lucas, A British Experiment
in the Control of Competition: The Coal Mines Act of 1930 (1934) 48 QuAn. JouR. or Ec.
418; British Coal (Aug. 1935) 71 THE EcoNxozsT 221.
105. For reasoned criticism of the type of control upon which the Coal Bill Is based see
Lucas, British Experiments in the Reduction of Excess Industrial Capacity (1934) 12 HAV,
Bus. RE;v. 389; Lucas, The British Movement for Industrial Reconstruction and the Con-
trol of Competitive Activity (1935) 49 QuAn. JouR. or Ec. 206; Pribram, Controlled
Competition and the Organization of American Industry (1935) 49 QuAR. JOuR. or Ec. 371.
1. For a review of the earlier forms of such measures, see Legis. (1931) 80 U. o PA. L.
Rxv. 289; Comment (1931) 40 YA.x L. J. 431.
2. 283 U. S. 527 (1931). Similar statutes are now extant in a number of states. See
Ala. Acts 1931, No. 369; Colo. Laws 1935, c. 216; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 113; Ind. Acts 1929,
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uated according to the volume of gross sales.3 But certain other taxes con-
taining elements of both the foregoing schemes have recently been enacted.
Their validity has not yet been determined by the Supreme Court.
Such taxes are broadly classifiable into three main groups. The first of these
is typified by an Iowa statute which imposes a tax on the privilege of retailing,
the amount of which is calculated according to two schedules. Schedule A is
similar in form to the Indiana statute, exacting a specific sum graduated in
amount according to the number of stores within the state operated in a single
chain, but does not tax independents, as does the Indiana statute. Schedule B
exacts a tax of a specific sum from all retailers operating two or more stores,
the amount being based on the combined gross receipts from all the stores
under one management. Each such retailer must pay $25 for his gross receipts
up to $50,000, and an additional sum for each additional $10,000 of gross
receipts, these additional sums growing larger as total gross receipts increase.4
A second type of tax is introduced by a Florida statute which imposes a tax
on the privilege of retailing, likewise according to two schedules. Schedule A
c. 207, as amended by Acts 1933, c. 271; Ky. Special Session Acts 1934, c. 26; La. Stat.
(Dart, 1932) §§ 8664-8674; Me. Laws 1933, c. 260; Md. Laws 1933, c. 542; Mich. Acts
1933, No. 265, as amended by Acts 1935, No. 177; Mont. Laws 1933, c. 155; N. C. Code
(1935) 6,7880 (93); S. C. Code (1932) § 2556; W. Va. Acts 1933, c. 36. The Washington
legislature enacted a similar statute, but it was vetoed. Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, § 99. Since
the Jackson case, this type of tax has been widely upheld. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 83S (1930), aff'd, 284 U. S. 575 (1931); Fox v. Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87 (1935); Southern Grocery Stores v. South Carolina Tax
Commission, 55 F. (2d) 931 (E. D. S. C. 1932); J. C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 54 Idaho
374, 32 P. (2d) 784 (1934); Midwestern Petroleum Corporation v. State Bd. of Tax
Com'rs, 206 Ind. 68S, 187 N. E. 882 (1933); C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659,
259 N. W. 352 (1935); Safeway Stores v. City of Portland, 149 Ore. 581, 42 P. (2d) 162
(1935); see Read Drug & Chemical Company v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250, 254, 166 At. 742,
744 (1933). But d. City of Douglas v. South Georgia Grocery Co., 180 Ga. 519, 179 S. E.
768 (1935). But it is invalid if graduated according to the number of counties in which a
chain operates. Louis K. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933).
3. 294 U. S. 550 (1935). Two states had enacted similar statutes. Vt. Laws 1933, c. 46;
Wis. Laws 1933, c. 469. They were both held void. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Harvey, 177 Atl. 423 (Vt. 1935); Ed. Schuster & Co. v. Henry, 261 N. W. 20 (Wis. 1935),
cert. denied, sub nom. Henry v. Wardhams Oil Co., U. S. Law Week, Oct. 22, 1935, p. 13.
The Vermont statute has been repealed. Vt. Acts 1935, No. 36. Other states have com-
bined this form of tax with the Indiana type. Min. Laws 1933, c. 213; S. D. Laws 1935,
c. 204.
4. Iowa Acts 1935, c. 75. Schedule A and portions of schedule B are set forth below.
For purposes of comparison, the approximate range of percentages of gross receipts which
may be exacted by schedule B is inserted on the extreme right.
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adopts the same principle as the Indiana statute, in that it imposes a tax of a
specific sum per store, graduated in amount according to the number of
stores within the state under common management. But it differs from
the Indiana statute in that as the length of the chain increases, the tax ex-
acted for every store in the chain grows larger, whereas under the Indiana
statute, as the chain increases in length, the tax is increased only as applied
to the particular stores which are considered as lengthening the chain.
Schedule B likewise classifies retailers according to the number of stores
operated, but instead of imposing a tax of a specific sum per store, it taxes the
members of each class at a percentage of gross receipts, the percentage rate
being graduated according to classes.5 The third type of tax is exemplified by
a municipal ordinance, which also classifies retailers according to the number
of stores operated. Under this device, a member of any one class must pay a
minimum specific sum for his gross sales up to $1000, and an additional sum
for each additional $1000 of gross sales, the amount of both the minimum
specific sum and the additional sum being increased from class to class. While
this tax, operating within any one class, is somewhat similar in form to schedule
SCHEDULE B
Tax for each additional Possible range of
$10,000 of gross Range of % of gross
Class Total Gross Receipts receipts total tax receipts
1. $50,000 $2S .05%-
2. 50,000-100,000 $10 35-75 .06%-.08%
3. 100,000-150,000 25 100-200 .097-.14%
4. 150,000-200,000 60 260-500 .16.%-.26%
24. 6,000,000-7,000,000 700 236,700-306,000 3.9%-4.4%
25. 7,000,000-8,000,000 800 306,800-386,000 4.4%-4.8%
26. 8,000,000-9,000,000 900 386,900-476,000 4.8%-5.3%
27. over 9,000,000 1000 486,000- 5.3%-
Taxes similar in form to schedule B have been enacted elsewhere. Alaska Comp. Laws
(1933), § 3138 (13); La. Acts, 3d Extraordinary Session 1934, No. 15, §§ 8, 9; N. M. Extra
Session Laws 1934, c. 33. The Louisiana tax apparently does not discriminate against
chains, since it requires a separate license for each store. The Alaska statute is not explicit
as to whether the tax is to be determined by gross sales of individual establishments or of
the combined establishments in a chain. For the ratio of the amount of the tax to gross
sales under the Louisiana and New Mexico statutes, see Martin and Tolman, Recent Stale
Gross Sales Tax Legislation (1934) 12 TAx MAG. 15, 17.
5. Fla. Gen. Laws 1935, c. 16848, repealing Fla. Laws 1933, c. 16071. The statute
further provides that if schedule B proves invalid, schedule A is nevertheless to stand, and
the amount payable thereunder doubled. Both schedules are set forth below:
SCHEDULE A SCHEDULE B
Tax for each Percent of
Class No. of stores store in chain Class No. of stores gross receipts
1. 1 $ 10 1. 1 .5%
2. 2-3 50 2. 2-3 1%
3. 4-6 100 3. 4-6 2%
4. 7-10 200 4. 7-10 3%
5. 11-15 300 5. 11-15 4%
6. over 15 400 6. over 15 5%
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B of the Iowa statute, it contains an important distinguishing feature, for the
additional sums do not grow larger as total gross sales increase, but remain con-
stant in amount.6
The purpose of these taxes seems to accord with that of the Indiana type of
statute, in that they apparently seek to discriminate against chains in favor of
independents, and against longer chains more heavily than shorter ones. But
they appear to have the further purpose of minimizing some of the more obvious
inequities of the Indiana scheme. Under the latter type of statute, there is no
direct relation between the amount of the tax and the volume or type of busi-
ness done. As a result, two chains of equal length must pay the same tax re-
gardless of the fact that one may be composed of much larger stores, and hence
do a far larger volume of business than the other. In such a case, ability to
pay is in all probability disregarded. For assuming that the two chains of equal
length operate on approximately equal profit ratios, the one which does the
larger volume of business is obviously- better able to absorb the tax. Moreover,
assuming a similar elasticity of demand in each business, the latter chain will,
by reason of its ability to spread the tax over a greater volume of sales, be
better able to pass the tax on to the consumer.7  These hybrid statutes seem-
6. Spartanburg, License Ordinance 1933. The ordinance appears in Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 170 S. C. 262, 170 S. E. 273 (1933). Another
South Carolina municipality enacted a similar ordinance. Charleston, License Ordinance
1934. The Spartanburg tax is set forth below in the first schedule. The approximate
minimum percentages of gross sales exacted from each class by the minimum sum is
inserted at the right. The second schedule indicates the possible range in the percentage of
gross sales exacted from members of class 1 and class 6, as their gross sales increase.
Tax as between classes
Minimum % of
gross sales
Muinimum tax on gross exacted by
sales of $5000 Additional tax for each minimum
Class or less additional $1000 sum
1. (1 store) $ 7.50 $1.50 .155-
2. (2 stores) 15.00 3.00 .3%
3. (3 stores) 30.00 5.00 .6
4. (4 stores) 60.00 S.O0 1.2,
5. (5 stores) 90.00 5.001.8%
6. (over 5 stores) 100.00 S.O 2%
Operation of tax on first and sixth lasses
First class Sixth class
Range of 5 Range of 5
Gross sales Total tax of gross sales Gross sales Total tax of gross sales
-$5000 $7.50 .15%- -$5000 $10D 2&-
5000-6000 9.00 .1S%-.18% 5000-6000 10S 1.7%-2.1%
6000-7000 10.50 .15o-.175% 6000-7000 110 1.6%co-1.8%o
7000-8000 12.00 .15%-.17c% 7000-800D 115 1.4%-1.6%o
7. The inequitable results of this type of statute are particularly vell illustrated by the
effect of such a tax on a chain of filling stations. Cf. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
Fox, 6 Fed. Supp. 494 (S. D. W. Va. 1934), rev'd, 294 U. S. 87 (1935); (1934) 43 YA= L.
J. 1022.
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ingly attempt to some extent to avoid these results, by basing the tax partially
-on the volume of business done.3 Their effect as between two chains of equal
length. is, of course, to tax more heavily the chain doing the larger volume of
business, which presumably enjoys greater benefits, and is better able to bear
the burden. And in achieving this result, they have the further effect of dis-
criminating more heavily against the longer chains in favor of the independents
and of the shorter chains.
These three varieties of taxes raise two important constitutional questions.0
The first problem is whether they contravene the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The second concerns the requirement of due process
-of law contained in both the federal and state constitutions. The first question
necessitates a separate and somewhat detailed consideration of each variety of
tax.
Considering first the Iowa type of statute, schedule A, under the authority
of the Jackson case, appears to satisfy the requirements of the equal protection
.clause. For it adopts the same classification as employed by the Indiana statute
upheld in the Jackson case, and the fact that it does not tax independents,
whereas the Indiana statute did, does not render it invalid.' 0 Schedule B, on
the other hand, raises a more difficult problem. Its form differs from that of
the Kentucky statute invalidated in the Stewart case, in that the amount of the
tax is fixed according to a schedule of specific sums, rather than by a percent-
age of gross sales. To this extent, it can be brought within Clark v. Titusville,
wherein the Supreme Court upheld a tax of specific amounts, graduated ac-
cording to gross sales.:" The Clark case was distinguished in the Stewart de-
8. Sec. 4 of the Florida statute states that two schedules are employed "in order to
equitably and properly fix the formula upon which the herein license fees shall be based
and so that the factor of number of stores and the factor of amount of business done
under the privilege shall be included in the formula." Cf. (1935) 48 HAMr. L. Pay. 1434, as
to the purpose of the Kentucky statute held void in the Stewart decision.
9. A minor problem is raised by schedule B of the Florida statute, since in stating the
measure of the tax, gross receipts from interstate commerce are not expressly excluded.
Any attempt to include such receipts would be unconstitutional, with the possible exception
of a tax on a domestic corporation. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292
(1917); see GAvrr, T Co. rE cE CLAusF (1932) §§ 180, 185. But in accordance with
the presumption of the validity of legislation, the tax will probably be construed as ex-
cluding gross receipts arising from interstate commerce. Cf. Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576
(1914); Moore v. State Bd. of Charities and Corrections, 239 Ky. 729, 40 S. W. (2d) 349
(1931). In any event, the problem will doubtless not prove serious, since the tax Is Imposed
only on retailers.
10. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838 (1930),
aff'd, 284 U. S. 575 (1931) ; see (1931) 7 IND. L. J. 179, 180.
11. 184 U. S. 329 (1902). The tax is set forth below, the approximate range of per-
centages of gross sales exacted from each class being inserted at the right. Unlike the
other schedules, the classes here are arranged from maximum to minimum gross sales.
Possible range of percent of
Class Gross sales Total tax gross sales
1. Over $60,000 $100 -.177
2. 50,000-60,000 80 .13%-.167
3. 40,000-50,000 70 .14%-.187
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cision on the ground that the ordinance involved in the former merely increased
the total amount of the tax as gross sales increased, whereas the Kentucky
statute exacted a higher percentage of gross sales, as gross sales increased 2
In actual operation, however, schedule B of the Iowa statute contains this same
defect, for the specific sums are increased in amount so rapidly, that in terms of
percentages, the rate tends to increase as gross receipts increase.4 Accordingly,
schedule B of the Iowa statute, and the Kentucky statute invalidated in the
Stewart case, are substantially the same in effect, with the slight difference that
the former exacts one flat sum for all gross receipts within a particular bracket,
whereas under the latter statute, within a particular bracket, the amount pay-
able varied according to the greater or less amount of sales. Therefore, it is
possible that schedule B of the Iowa tax may be declared void under the au-
thority of the Stewart case.'3
Schedule A of the Florida statute, like the first schedule of the Iowa statute,
may be held valid under the Jackson decision. The fact that the Florida statute
exacts a higher tax for each store as the length of the chain increases, rather
than increasing the amount only as applied to each successive group of stores
in the chain, is of no consequence. For, all the advantages accruing to a chain
by virtue of its increased length would seem to attach to each component unit
in the chain, thereby permitting the imposition of a higher tax for each such
unit than for the stores of a smaller chain.' 4
But schedule B of the Florida statute presents at least two problems under
the equal protection clause, which are more complex in nature than those raised
4. 30,000-40,000 60 .1s -.25
5. 20,000-30,000 50 .17-.25%




10. -100 5 .5,.o
12. See Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 564 (1935). As s.hovn sftp
note 11, the percentage of gross sales exacted by the tax in the Clark case tended to de-
crease as gross sales increased.
13. Preliminary injunctions against the collection of the Iowa tax have been granted by
a federal district court, Graham Department Stores Co. v. Valentine, The Great A. & P.
Tea Co. v. Valentine, Walgreen Co. v. Valentine, Eq. Nos. 4583-4585 (S. D. Iowa, July 18,
1935); and by a state district court, Brenner Tea Company v. Valentine, Eq. No. 49440
(Polk Co. D. C. Iowa, July 19, 1935).
14. Some of the earlier cases indicated that the so-called "retroactive" scheme of raising
the tax for each store in the chain as the length of the chain increased would invalidate the
tax. Cf. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Dougton, 196 N. C. 145, 144 S. E. 701 (1928);
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838 (1930); F. W.
Woolworth Co. v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 179, 156 S. E. 904 (1931). But more recent deisions
have upheld statutes containing this element. Louis K. Liggett v. Amos, 104 Fla. 609, 141
So. 153 (1932) (In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court said: "The addition of a
store to an existing chain is a privilege, and an increase of the tax on all the stores for the
privilege of expanding the chain can not be condemned as arbitrary, . . . " Louis K.
Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 533, 534); J. C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 54 Idaho 374, 32
P. (2d) 784 (1934); cf. Penny Stores v. Mitchell, 59 F. (2d) 789 (S. D. Miss. 1932).
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by the preceding schedule. 15 The first question is whether a proper classifica-
tion is made; the second, whether the members of each class are similarly
treated. Construed as a tax on the privilege of doing business, the classification
made by schedule B seems valid. For unlike the Kentucky statute held vold
in the Stewart decision, the rate of the tax is not graduated according to amount
of sales made; rather, it is graduated according to the number of stores operated
in a single chain, a classification upheld in the Jackson case. It would seem
that if the differences between chains of varying lengths are sufficient to justify
graduating the amount of a tax which exacts a specific sum per store, they
should likewise justify graduating the percentage rate of a gross receipts tax.
Nor can it be said that a different result should follow in the case of the
Florida tax on the ground that the differences between chains separately classi-
fied bear no reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute. For the purpose
of the statute does not differ from that of the Indiana tax upheld in the Jack-
son decision. Both may be construed as revenue measures, although the funda-
mental aim of each is doubtless to handicap chains.' 0 The mere fact that the
Florida statute endeavors to make the discrimination more pronounced against
the larger chains does not indicate a difference in purpose between the two
statutes. Nor would schedule B of the Florida tax be invalid even if con-
strued, as was the Kentucky statute in the Stewart case, 17 as a tax on sales18
rather than on the privilege of doing business.' 9 The Court objected to the
15. A minor problem similar to that raised by schedule A results from the fact that the
percentage rate is increased as to the gross receipts of all the stores in the chain as the length
of the chain increases, rather than only as applied to the gross receipts of each succemive
group of stores. This should not affect the validity of the tax. See note 14, supra.
16. See (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1022, 1023, n. 7.
17. The Court placed two interpretations on the Kentucky tax. In the second, the
tax was clearly treated as imposed on the privilege of retailing. But there has been some
confusion as to the first interpretation. Perhaps because of some of the cases cited by the
Court, it has been suggested that the statute was considered as imposing a property tax on
the goods sold. See Ed. Schuster & Co. v. Henry, 261 N. W. 20, 22 (Wis. 1935); (1935) 35
COL. L. Rxv. 606. The Court, however, described it as an excise tax. See Stewart Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 556 (1935): "And the excise is laid in respect to the
same activity. . . ". Accordingly, the Court apparently interpreted the tax first as Im-
posed on sales. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Harvey, 177 At. 423, 427 (Vt,
1935); (1935) 33 MicE. L. Rav. 1278; (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. REv. 1024.
18. The Florida statute appears less like a tax on sales than the Kentucky statute, for
it is measured by gross cash receipts and not sales. Fla. Gen. Laws 1935, c. 75, § 7a, A
similar tax was apparently considered as imposed on a privilege in Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.
S. 576 (1914). But cf. Ed. Schuster & Co. v. Henry, 261 N. W. 20 (Wis. 1935) (tax
measured by gross income). Moreover, the tax for doing business in one month Is
measured by receipts from the preceding month. Id. § 6. This factor has heretofore In-
fluenced the Court to adopt the concept of a tax on the privilege of doing business. Educa-
tional films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379 (1931). Nor will the tax be construed as laid
on gross receipts, and hence as a property tax. Ohio Tax Cases, sgpra; City of Do Land
v. Florida Public Service Co., 161 So. 735 (Fla. 1935). Even if construed as a tax on
property, the variation in rates could be justified on the theory that the receipts spring
from different businesses, and hence from different sources. See Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Penna., 277 U. S. 389, 402 (1928).
19. In his dissent in Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550 (1935), Justice
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Kentucky statute as taxing the first sale of one retailer at a different rate than
the thousandth sale of another retailer, on the ground that no substantial dif-
ference was shown between the two sales. The Florida statute, however, is
not open to this objection. For the differences which exist between the business
of a short chain and that of a long chain would seem to exist between an
isolated sale made by the former, and an isolated sale made by the latter, and
again, the Jackson case is authority for the proposition that such differences
justify a difference of treatment in the application of a tax.20
If the classification be deemed valid, there appears little basis for arguing
that the Florida statute violates the equal protection clause by failing to afford
similar treatment to members of the same class. Unlike the Kentucky statute,
the same flat rate is applied to all retailers within any one classification. Of
course, as between two chains falling within the same class, if the one does a larger
business than the other, it will be taxed a greater amount. This result differs
from that of the Indiana statute which taxed each chain comprised of the same
number of stores at the same amount. But this fact is seemingly of no im-
portance. For the Indiana case can hardly be said to have established the rule
that in chain store taxation, every chain of the same length must be taxed at
the same, amount. The Indiana statute was construed as a revenue measure,
and revenue measures imposing a tax on the privilege of doing business,
measured by a flat rate applied to gross sales or gross receipts, have uniformly
been sustained, both where the same flat rate was applied to all those taxed,2"
and where different flat rates were applied to different types of business,2
Cardozo said, p. 566: "The prevailing opinion commits the court to a holding that a tax
upon gross sales, if laid upon a graduated basis, is always and inevitably a dental of the
equal protection of the laws, no matter how slight the gradient or moderate the tax."
From the dosing words, it can be inferred that the Justice was thinking of the amount of
the tax, rather than other possible bases for classification.
20. In Penny Stores v. Mitchell, 59 Fed. (2d) 789 (S. D. Miss. 1932), appml diLsmisd
per stipulation of counsel, sub nom. Penny Stores v. Rice, 287 U. S. 672 (1932), a Mizzei-
sippi statute essentially similar to schedule B of the Florida tax vas upheld. The court con-
sidered it to be a tax on a privilege, rather than on sales but thought it valid under either
theory. The lower court had previously granted an interlocutory injunction against the
enforcement of the statute, and the Supreme Court had affirmed this, stating that there
was no abuse of discretion, since at the time the injunction was entered, the JacLson case
had not been decided. Mitchell v. Penny Stores, 284 U. S. 576 (1931). The inference
may be drawn that the Supreme Court considered the Misesppi statute as coming within
the Jackson case. A federal district court of three judges has recently upheld schedule
A of the Florida tax, and granted an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement of
schedule B, with the brief statement that it was controlled by the Stewart case. Lane
Drug Stores, Inc. v. J. M. Lee (N. D. Fla., July 15, 1935). A temporary injunction
against the enforcement of the entire act has been entered by a Florida circuit court. Bond-
Howell Lumber Co. v. J. Al. Lee, Leon County C. C. (Fla., June 28, 1935).
21. Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114 (1910); Wiseman v. Phillips, 84 S. W.
(2d) 91 (Ark. 1935); Jones v. Gordy, 180 AUt. 272 (Md. 1935); Morrow v. Henneford, 47
P. (2d) 1016 (Wash. 1935); see Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Levis, 294 U. S. 550, 563
(1935); Comment (1935) 33 MicH. L. REv. 614; Note (1934) 89 A. L. R. 1432.
22. Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576 (1914); Penny Stores v. Mitchell, 59 F. (2d) 789
(S. D. Miss. 1932); Central States Life Ins. Co. v. State, 190 Ark. 605, 80 S. W. (2d) 628
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although under such a tax, more is exacted from those receiving a large gross
income than from those receiving a smaller one.
The type of tax illustrated by the municipal ordinance must likewise be
considered first as to whether it is based on a proper classification, and second,
as to whether members of the same class are accorded equal treatment. As in
the Florida statute, the classification adopted is similar to that of the Indiana
statute, and therefore appears valid. While the tax differs from schedule B of
the Florida statute in that its amount is fixed by a schedule of specific sums
rather than by percentages of gross receipts, the actual effect of the two taxes is
substantially the same. For the minimum sums payable under the ordinance
are increased in amount so rapidly as applied to each successive class, that in
terms of percentages, there is a tendency to tax each successive class at a
higher percentage of gross sales.0 Accordingly, the same arguments must be
made to sustain the validity of the classification as in the case of schedule B
of the Florida statute. Assuming that the classification is proper, the problem
as to equal protection between members of the same class is somewhat similar
to that raised by schedule B of the Iowa statute. For each member of a par-
ticular class is taxed at a specific sum, graduated in amount according to gross
sales. But it is more clearly within the Clark case than the Iowa statute, since
it is similar to the ordinance thereupheld, not only in form, but also in effect.
While the specific sums exacted from the members of each class are graduated
in amount, they do not grow larger rapidly enough to exact an increasing per-
centage of gross sales as gross sales increase. 6 Accordingly, it would seem that
the ordinance does not deny equal protection between members of the same
class, unless the Clark case was entirely overruled by the Stewart decision.23
The second major question raised, at least by the Iowa and Florida statutes,
concerns the requirements of due process of law. The combined result of the
two schedules in each case is to impose a much heavier burden on the longer
chains than any hitherto attempted, and may well result in driving some of
them out of business.24 But the Court has consistently refused to strike down
(1935); Reif v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N. E. 889 (1933); Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa.
614, 46 AUt. 861 (1900) ; State ex rel. Botkin v. Welsh, 61 S. D. 593, 251 N. W. 189 (1933);
State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P. (2d) 91 (1933); cf. Clark v. Titusville,
184 U. S. 329 (1902); White v. Moore, 46 P. (2d) 1077 (Ariz. 1935); Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 170 S. C. 262, 170 S. E. 273 (1933).
23. Before the Stewart case, it was held that the ordinance did not deny equal protec-
tion, either between classes, or between members of the same class. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 170 S. C. 262, 170 S. E. 273 (1933).
24. The highest percentage of gross sales previously exacted was the 4% rate In the
Vermont statute, held void in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Harvey, 177 Atl. 423 (Vt.
1935). Both the Iowa and Florida statutes exceed this rate in the top brackets. And 11
schedule B of the Florida statute is held void, and schedule A therefore doubled In amount
as provided, the resulting tax in the top bracket of $800 for each store in the chain will
exceed previous state license taxes. See Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 619, 629. In Lane
Drug Stores, Inc. v J. M. Lee (N. D. Fla., 1935), the plaintiffs set forth a table showing
the effects of the Florida tax on 20 chains. For the period covered, the tax would ap-
parently cause a net loss to 1& of the 20 chains. See Memorandum of Plaintiffs (Points
V & VI) p. 14a. The solution adopted by many of the chains is to convert the concern
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a state revenue measure as violating the Federal Constitution merely because
it is confiscatory in amount,2 5 although there is some indication that it might
do so if the measure on its face revealed that it was enacted for other than
revenue purposes.26 In the light of previous decisions, notably those as to chain
store taxes, it seems unlikely that the Court would bring the statutes in ques-
tion under the latter qualification by construing them otherwise than as
revenue measures. 27 Accordingly, they appear fairly safe from an attack under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But the statutes face more serious obstacles in the requirements of due process
under the respective state constitutions. Decisions in both Iowa2- and Florida3
indicate that a tax, which is sufficiently burdensome to drive a considerable
number of people out of an otherwise lawful business, will be considered by
the state courts as violating the state constitutional requirements. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court will strike down a tax if it is satisfied that the state courts
would hold it void.3 It remains open, therefore, for the chains to show that
the taxes violate the standards set by the state courts. This may be somewhat
difficult,31 but if it can be done, the statutes may be held invalid.
A prediction as to the ultimate fate of these taxes can hardly be made with
any degree of assurance. It may be inferred from the Stewart case that a
majority of the Court believe that the Indiana type of statute should mark
the absolute limit of anti-chain legislation. And while the amount of a tax
into a wholesale house, distributing to a voluntary chain. See Supplement to Bill of Com-
plaint in Bond-Howell Lumber Co. v. J. M. Lee (C. C. Leon County, Fla. 1935) at p. 12.
25. Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921); Afagnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S.
40 (1934); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87 (1935); see Stewart Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 561-563.
26. See Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 46 (1934); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87, 100 (1935); cf, Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
27. With the exception of Midwestern Petroleum Corporation v. State Bd. of Tax
Com'rs, 206 Ind. 688, 187 N. E. 882 (1933), the chain store taxes have apparently been
universally treated as revenue measures. See Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294
U. S. 87, 100 (1935); Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 555 (1935); (1934)
43 YALE. L. J. 1022. Even if interpreted as police measures, it might be found that the
legislatures had reasonable grounds for discouraging chains, and hence, that the taxes did
not violate due process. Midwestern Petroleum Corporation v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs.,
supra. But cf. Louis K. Liggett v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 (1928); Keystone Grocery Co.
v. Huster, Alleghany County Court, Mld., Eq. Case No. 10922 (1927).
28. State v. Osborne, 171 Iowa 678, 154 N. W. 294 (1915); see State v. Lordon, 215
Iowa 1297, 1300, 248 N. W. 4, 5 (1933).
29. The Florida court has frequently applied the test suggested in the text to tax
measures, although a state statute has apparently never been held void. Louis K. Liggett
v. Amos, 104 Fla. 609, 141 So. 153 (1932); Gray v. Central Florida Lumber Co., 104 Fla.
446, 140 So. 320 (1932); Jerome H. Sheip v. Amos, 100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699 (1930); see
City of De Land v. Florida Public Service Co., 161 So. 735, 737 (Fla. 1935). A state
circuit court held the Florida tax void under the state constitution. Bond-Howell Lumber
Co. v. Lee, Leon County C. C. (Fla. 1935).
30. Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933); see Stewart Dry Goods Co. v.
Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 578 (1935) (Cardozo J., dissenting).
31. Cf. Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576 (1914).
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has no place in legal reasoning as to the requirements of the Federal Consti-
tution, it is not altogether clear that this factor plays no part in the judicial
process.32  Taking these matters into consideration, it seems not at all unlikely
that the statutes in question, inasmuch as the taxes they impose appear par-
ticularly burdensome, will be declared unconstitutional insofar as they represent
departures from the Indiana type of statute. If they are to be held void, the
result could be justified with some degree of consistency in the case of the Iowa
statute, on the ground that it denies equal protection of the laws. The muni-
cipal ordinance could be similarly disposed of, provided the Clark case is treated
as overruled by the Stewart decision. But the only available basis for invali-
dating schedule B of the Florida statute under the Federal Constitution appears
to be the somewhat dubious proposition that differences between classes which
will justify a difference in treatment under one form of tax, viz. the Indiana
type of tax, will not necessarily justify a difference in treatment under another
form of tax, viz. the Florida tax.3 3  The Florida statute, if it were to be held
void, could more logically be held so on the ground that it violates the state
constitution. Although this basis for invalidating schedule B of the Florida
tax would entail a certain amount of uncertainty and factual investigation in
each individual case arising in the future, nevertheless, if it is to be held un-
constitutional, it would seem more desirable to do so on this ground rather than
that of the equal protection clause. For the form of tax employed could thus
be preserved, and if imposed at less prohibitive rates, such a tax would appear
more equitable in operation than the Indiana type of statute.
SOME LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT
THE terms of the national constitution forbid a state to enter into any treaty,
alliance, or confederation, and require Congressional consent for "any agree-
ment or compact with another state, or with a foreign power."' Within the
32. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in the Stewart case imply that if the
Court can see its way clear to controlling the amount of a tax, it may look on the tax
more favorably. See Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 562, 577 (1935).
33. Support for this proposition can perhaps be found in the somewhat tenuous dis-
tinction drawn by the Court between the ordinance upheld in the Clark case, and the
Kentucky statute invalidated in the Stewart case. And cf. Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman,
277 U. S. 32 (1928).
1. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 10. For general discussions of the scope of the interstate com-
pact power: ELY, OIL CONSERVATION. nROUGH INTERSTATE AcREEWMENT (1933) 166; OLsrN,
COLORADO RivER COMPACT (1926) 65; SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL Dis-
PUTES (1927) 43; WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SovEREoN STATES (1924) 69;
WIGMORE, PROBLMS Or TE LAW (1920) 126; Bruce, Compacts and Agreements (1918)
2 MINN. L. REv. 500; Carpenter, Reserve Treaty Powers oj the States (1921) 24 COLO. BAR
Ass'N REP. 45; Chamberlain, Legislation Through Compacts (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 207;
Donovan, State Compacts (1931) 80 U. or PA. L. REv. 5; Frankfurter and Landis, The
Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments (1925) 34 YALE
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boundaries of this clause states have compacted in pairs or groups to compromise
political controversies too technical or too vague for satisfactory adjudication
before the Supreme Court;2 to create joint administrative bodies entrusted with
special jobs; 3 and to seek progress cooperatively in such fields as social welfare
legislation4 and the regulation of industry- where independent legislative action
by one state, if decisive enough to increase costs, succeeds only in driving indus-
try to less active states. The compact has become the routine procedure for
settling boundary disputes,( water rights,7 and jurisdiction over boundary waters6
L. J. 685; Johnson, Uniform Laws by Interstate Compact (1903) 29 Orro STATn BAn Ass's:
REP. 174; Landis, Report on Compacts (1932) 42 HAsm'Boor NAT. Co.r. Co.-. Uw.
STATE LAws 280; Macmahon, Interstate Compacts (1931) 4 E.;cyc. Soc. ScxsucEs 109;
Patch, Interstate Compacts (1935) 1 E. R. R. 473; Wigmore, Report on Compacts (1921) 31
HANDBOO NAT. CoNs. Coma . Um'p. STATE LAws 297; Wigmore, Interstate Compacts as
the Solution for Lack of State Power (1932) 26 Ir.r.. L. REV. 318; Wilson, Interstate Com-
pacts under the Constitution (1932) 57 A. B. A. REP. 734; (1926) 26 Cor. L. Rxv. 216;
(1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 76; (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 322; (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 499;
(1929) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. 515; (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 635. For lists of compacts already
negotiated, see WARPaY, op. cit. supra, at 121; ELY, op. cit. supra, at 730-758; Library of
Congress, Appendix (1931) 41 HANDBOo NAT. Co.nF. Coar-nz Unrm. STATE Lws 361. For
bibliography, see ELY, op. cit. supra, at 398.
2. The Supreme Court has frequently urged a compact on litigant states as a practical
alternative to intolerably arduous suits. See Kidd v. Alabama, 183 U. S. 730 (1903);
Washington v. Oregon, 214 U. S. 205, 217 (1909), affg 211 U. S. 127 (1903); Minnesota
v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. 273, 283 (1920) ; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 313 (1921).
3. Typically, joint boards for administering harbor development, interstate bridges,
tunnels, and parks. The outstanding example of the use of the compact in this field is
the Port of New York Authority. Laws of N. J. 1921, c. 151; 1922, c. 9; 1930, c. 244;
Laws of N. Y. 1921, c. 154; 1922, c. 43; 1930, c. 419; 42 STAT. 174-180; 822-826 (1921-1922).
Cohen, The New York Harbor Problem (1920) 5 CORN. L. Q. 373; The Port of New York
Authority (1933) 8 FORTUNE 22; Comment (1926) 39 HAM. L. REv. 499; Comment (1922)
31 YALE L. J. 635. For other agreements for the joint performance of an administrative
function, see ELY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 190.
4. See infra p. 338 and notes 67, 69.
5. Industrial regulation by compact has been widely discussed. Bingham, Regulation
of the Interstate Transmission of Electric Power (1929) 5 J. or LA&ND mm PuD. Unm. E_,e:.
385; Donovan, Regulation of the Interstate Transmission of Gas and Electricity (1931)
56 A. B. A. REP. 750; ELSBREE, INTzERsTATE TR.nsmissIon or Erxcmic Pov'in (1931) 172,
178-181; ELY, op. cit. supra note 1, passim; Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 1, at 703;
Pinchot, Proclamation Penn. Laws, Spec. Sess, 1926, 4, 5; REPoRT, Gx&T Pov,, BoAm
or Pm-q. (1926) 177; (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1137; (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. REv. 436;
N. Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1935, at 5, col. 5.
6. For lists of boundary problems settled by compacts, cf. Er., op. cit. supra note 1,
at 359-393.
7. Apportionment of waters is the most important issue yet subjected to settlement by
compact, and almost every western state is party to one or more water compacts. For
a list of such agreements, see ELY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 381-388. Compact problems in
adjusting claims to water rights are discussed in OLsEN, op. cit. supra note 1; Bannister,
Colorado River Compact (1924) 9 CoPN. L. Q. 388; Carpenter, loc. cit. supra note 1; Corthell,
The Colorado River Problem (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 289; Delaware River Plater Compact
(1927) 16 NAT. Mluo. R.v. 427.
8. For typical applications of such compacts, see Wedding v. Mfeyler, 192 U. S. 573
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among states and, on a few occasions at least, between states and foreign powers 0
Since 1911 cautious experiment has widened the usefulness of the compact ° and
recommendations are current to use it in the solution of many problems now
complicated by conflicts of laws and jurisdictions: typically, interstate crime
enforcement,:" interstate taxation,' 2 international commercial law;13 the initia-
tion of "joint adventures to promote the public welfare"' 14 within the province
of the states' police power; the direct regulation of such regional industries as
coal, oil, cotton, and milk, which are conspicuously disorganized; and finally, the
formulation of regional policies for labor. There has been a steady acceleration
during the last fifteen years in the rate of recourse to the interstate compact as
an instrument of statecraft and social policy; the popularity of the device will
almost surely continue to increase.', As a matter of political theory, the corn-
(1903); Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U. S. 315 (1909); Nicoulin v. O'Brien, 248 U. S. 113 (1918);
State v. Babcock, 30 N. J. L. 29 (1862); Ferguson y. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954
(1891); State v. Faudre, 54 W. Va. 122, 46 S. E. 269 (1903); (1909) 22 HARv. L. Ray. 599.
9. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540 (U. S. 1840); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S.
407 (1886); Canada Northern Ry. Co. v. International Bridge Co., 7 Fed. 653 (N. D. N. .
1880), 8 Fed. 190 (N. D. N. Y. 1881); People v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321, 325 (1872); People
v. International Bridge Co., 223 N. Y. 137, 119 N. E. 351 (1918); McHenry v. Brady,
37 N. D. 59, 163 N. W. 540 (1917); 3 OF. ATT'y GEN. 661 (1841); Bruce, Compacts and
Agreements (1918) 2 MINN. L. REv. 500; (1918) 27 YAr. L. J., 406.
10. Since 1789 Congress has approved 56 interstate compacts, 12 before 1900, 30 since
1918. Patch, Interstate Compacts (1935) 1 E. R. R. 473, 479. A Resolution of Congress
in 1911 (36 STAT. 961) giving general consent to interstate compacts for the conservation
of forests and water supply, though never used, was the first application of the compact
idea to problems more novel than settling jurisdiction over boundary waters.
11. 48 STAT. 909, § 1, 18 U. S. C. A. § 420 (1934); Sess. Laws Colo. 1935, 591-596; Laws
of Indiana 1935, c. 289, p. 1441; Copeland, Defensive Alliances (1934) 7 STATE G0V'T 106;
Dean, The Interstate Compact (1934) 1 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMxS 460.
12. Putney, Elimination of Conflicts in Taxation (1934) 2 E. R. R. 371; Wlgmore,
Compacts between States (1925) 19 ILL. L. REv. 479; Wigmore, Report (1921) 31 NAT.
CoNF. Comm. UN-i. STATE LAws 297, 313. Senator Wagner has introduced a resolution
(March, 1935) authorizing states to negotiate compacts aiming at the elimination of dupli.
cation and evasion of state and local taxes, as recommended by the Interstate Commisjion
on Conflicting Taxation [(1933) REPORT 22, 34] and the Second Interstate Assembly, March
2, 1935.
13. WIOMORE, PROBLEMS or THE LAW (1920) 126; Wigmore, Report (1921) 31 IANi-
BOOX NAT. CoNp. Comm. Umi0roa STATE LAWS 277, 299.
14. City of New York v. Willcox, 115 Misc. 351, 353, 189 N. Y. Supp. 724, 726 (Sup.
Ct. 1921).
15. Conservatives advocate a vigorous application of the compact method on the ground
that its exploitation offers a way to compromise with the popular demand for social action
without enlarging the scope of central government. DourLAS, Ta LIBRAL. TMAInol;
(1935) 124; Donovan, State Compacts (1931) 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 5; Donovan, supra
note 5, at 757-759; Compacts Preferred (1934) 7 STATE GovT. 140; Rep. McCormack (D.
Mass.) The Compact of Concord (1934) 78 CONG. Rac. 12211, 12272. Brandelsian liberals
support the use of compacts as a formula which may permit a solution of social problems
beyond the capacity of a single state without destroying the state as a convenient unit for
social experiment. Chafee, Interstate Interpleader (1924) 33 YAL.E L. J. 685, 727; Frank.
furter and Landis, The Compact Clause (1925) 34 YA.E L. J. 685; Landis, Report of
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pact is an ideal compromise with the doctrinal pattern of the Constitution, for
it offers a technique for satisfying certain generally shared social ambitions with-
out distorting the federal structure of multiple sovereignty.
This Comment will be concerned with two aspects of the interstate compact:
first, certain problems in the legal theory of the compact; second, the practical
possibilities of the compact as a legal solution for two dilemmas of economic
policy, now insoluble by Congress or the independent action of single states:
the direct regulation of industry; the improvement by statute of labor conditions.
LEGAL PROBLEMS
The law of interstate compacts is a corner of the undeveloped "common law"
which the Supreme Court, sitting as a quasi-international tribunal, has declared
in the settlement of conflicts between the states. Like other portions of that
peculiar jurisprudence, it consists in part of an exegesis of the constitution, in
part of the application of international law doctrines to compact problems.
Although the Constitution provides that "no state shall, without the consent
of Congress, .. .enter into any agreement or Compact with another State,"
it has been inferred from Story's Commentaries'" and from the leading cases of
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts'17 and Virginia v. Tennessee,1 8 that the consent of
Congress is required only when the program of the compacting states impinges
on interstate commerce or some other federal province, or alters the distribution
of political power among the states. If the Supreme Court extends this judicial
gloss on the words of the compact clause, an interstate compact can become valid
without the consent or despite the disapproval of Congress if the courts agree
that its subject matter is outside the ambit of congressional power. But such a
result is unwarranted, for the constitution requires Congressional consent to
any interstate compact or agreement. If the arrangement between the states is
in form a compact or agreement, in the meaning naturally attaching to those
terms, consent should be required without reference to its subject matter. The
Committee (1932) 42 HANDBoox NAT. Conu. Com. UNIF. STATE LAWS 280, 281. The
contrary liberal view is strongly put by others who find the compact a clumsy and futile
substitute for effective national action. Corwin, Lessons of the Colorado River Compact
(1927) 16 NAT. mR. REv. 459; Soule, Back to States Rights, Harper's liag., Sept. 1935,
484, 490; and see Vandenbosch, Regions versus States (1933) 21 Ky. L. 3. 432.
16. 2 STORY, ComrmaxmrAxaEs ON =E Co.,srruno, (Sth ed. 1891) §§ 1402, 1403.
17. 12 Pet. 657, 726 (U. S. 1838).
18. 148 U. S. 503, 518-520 (1893). For other statements of the doctrine Eo derived,
see Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 1$5, 170 (1894); St. Louis, S. F. Ry. Co. v. James, 161
U. S. 545, 562 (1896); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 17 (1900); Union Branch Ry. Co.
v. East Tenn. & Georgia Ry. Co., 14 Ga. 327, 338-341 (1853); McHenry County v. Brady,
37 N. D. 59, 163 N. W. 540 (1917) ; Searsburg v. Woodford, 76 Vt. 370, 57 AUt. 961 (1904).
Bruce, Compacts and Agreements (1918) 2 MmNn. L. REv. 500, 516. Dcspite occasional
dicta repeating the dictum of Virginia v. Tennessee, these cases are explicable as holding
that the concurrent action by the states in each instance did not give rise to a compact,
but to a lesser mutual relation. Commonwealth v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 793, 130 N. Y.
Supp. 713 (1st Dep't, 1911); Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200 (1845). Sharp
criticism of the doctrine of Virginia v. Tennessee is expressed in (1935) 35 COL. L. REv.
76, 78, notes 13-20.
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purpose of the rule is to reserve to Congress an appropriate power of review over
the entire process of compact-making among the states, an exercise of their
sovereignty capable of political misuse in confederations, alliances and other
groupings inconsistent with national unity.
Division has appeared as to the status of a compact when properly ratified.
One line of authority holds that Congressional consent makes every compact a
"law of the union."19 The doctrine is based on the dubious premise that Con-
gressional consent is necessary for compacts only when in substance they im-
pinge upon the legislative province of Congress. Then Congressional consent
is in effect legislation by Congress in a field where it has power to legislate.
The conclusion is inadequate as a matter of fact as well as of constitutional
theory. For, most compacts, even when they affect interstate commerce or some
other federal province, are not federal statutes in content, form or administra-
tion. They often concern matters which the courts have insisted are not' in
interstate commerce for purposes of regulation;20 they have not been subjected
to Congress' legislative deliberation; enforcement is controlled by state officers
or officers designated by the states acting together.
Nor does the theory that compacts are laws of the union help to explain why
state laws inconsistent with the non-federal parts of interstate compacts can be
invalidated by them. The cases are explicable if compacts are considered as
contracts of quasi-international status21 between states and as statutory law
of the compacting states. The essence of Congressional consent is then a grant
to the compacting states of permission to compact, and such consent does not
make a compact a law of the union in any significant sense. 22 Congress' super-
vision of compact-making among the states is thus a political function, inde-
pendent of Congress' other enumerated powers.23
19. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 565-566 (U. S. 1851), 18 I-low.
421, 430 (U. S. 1855); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 519 (1906).
20. And states may regulate interstate commerce when Congress is silent, and especially
when Congress approves, as long as state regulations so undertaken do not unduly burden
nor discriminate against interstate commerce; cf. Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 1, at
718-729; Bikle, The Silence of Congress (1927) 41 HAiv. L. REV. 200; Grant, The Scope
and Nature of Concurrent Power (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 995; (1935) 35 COL. L. Rav. 601.
21. Marlatt v. Silk, 11 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1837); Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185 (U. S. 1837);
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657 (U. S. 1838).
22. There is, however, one association of the term which it might be desirable to Impose
on compacts: that adjudication of rights under a compact involves a federal question.
In that way the difficulty of permitting two state supreme courts to come to opposite final
settlements of claims under the same instrument would be avoided. The question of whether
the relevance of a compact to a controversy confers jurisdiction on the federal courts has
not been conclusively settled. In a brief, but perfectly unambiguous case, not since cited
[People v. Central Railroad, 12 Wall. 455, 456 (U. S. 1870)] it was said that "the assent
of Congress did not make the act giving it a statute of the United States in the sense of the
25th section of the Judiciary Act.. .. It has no effect beyond giving the consent of Con-
gress to the compact between the two states." But see Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky,
219 U. S. 140, 161 (1911). Other cases bearing on this issue are Hamburg American Co,
v. Grube, 196 U. S. 407,413 (1905) ; Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 289, 295 (1918); Ken-
tucky v. Indiana, 281 U. S. 163, 173 (1930). Randolph, Suits Between States (1902) 2
CoL. L. Rav. 364, 378.
23. Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478, 494-495 (U. S. 1854).
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Regarded then as contracts between states, supplemented by necessary state
legislation,24 compacts are obviously analogous to treaties, and their legal status
has been developed in terms of international law doctrines.2 Compacts differ
from treaties in two important respects, viz., the degree of their superiority over
subsequent inconsistent legislation, and the completeness of their subjection to
constitutional limitations.
Unlike treaties, interstate compacts confer on individuals an immunity against
autonomous revision of the compact's terms by one signatory. Interstate com-
pacts, when properly ratified, invalidate subsequent acts of state legislatures in-
consistent with them.2 6
State statutes inconsistent with compacts have been declared invalid as im-
pairing the obligation of contracts.27 Thus, when the compact is concerned
essentially with private rights, the individual can claim the protection of the
compact as a beneficiary, whether or not the compact specifically declares his
position as beneficiary.2 8  But when an interstate compact establishes rights
which, when they accrued under national treaties, have been held to be "poli-
tical" rights only, not judicially protected against destruction by the sovereign,m
24. For the analogous distinction between a treaty itself, as a contract, and the legis-
lation required to execute it, see Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (U. S. 1829); United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 419 (1886).
25. Sims v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425 (U. S. 1799); Marlatt v. Silk, 11 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1837);
Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185 (U. S. 1837); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657
(U. S. 1838) ; Central Ry. Co. v. Jersey City, 209 U. S. 473 (1908) ; cf. Arizona v. California,
292 U. S. 341, 360 (1934). Caldwell, Settlement of Interstate Disputes (1920) 14 A=s. 3.
INT. LAw 38; Carpenter, loc. cit. supra note 1; Cohen, loc. cit. supra note 3; Wilon, Inter-
state Compacts under the Constitution (1932) 57 A. B. A. REP. 734; (1922) 31 YAM
L. J. 635.
26. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 69 (U. S. 1823); Hawkins v. Barney, 5 Pet. 457, 464
(U. S. 1831); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 565 (U. S.
1852), 18 How. 421, 430 (U. S. 1856); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 519 (1905);
Olin v. Kitzmiller, 259 U. S. 260 (1922); Allen v. McKean, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 229, 489.
(C. C. D. Me. 1833); Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 4 Gill.
& 3. 1, 108, 135 (Md. 1832).
27. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1823); Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U. S. 1,.
28, 30-31 (1911); Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 4 Gill. & J. I
(Md. 1832).
28. The right of action of a stranger to the contract is perhaps more apparent if stated,
in the contract; see terms of compact between Maryland and Virginia in Wharton v. Wise,.
153 U. S. 155, 166 (1894); and Sims v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425, 453 (U. S. 1799).
29. The duty of a nation to fulfill its international obligations is not in most circum-
stances judicially enforceable against a subsequent statute. Congress is bound to regard
-the public treaties, and where private rights, as the title to land, are at issue, subsequent
inconsistent acts or joint resolutions of Congress are invalid. Reichart v. Felps, 6 WalL
160, 165 (U. S. 1867); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, 32 (1899). Judicial power does not
extend to "political" violations of treaties. Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 324
(1904) ("In case of a conflict between an act of Congress and a treaty ... the one last
in date must prevail."); The Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884); Rainey v. United
States, 232 U. S. 310, 316 (1914); Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,799, 784 (C. C.
Mass. 1855); United States v. Domestic Fuel Co., 71 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. P. A. 1934).
The conflicting statute does not alter the rights of those subject to the law of nations,
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the right of an individual to invoke the compact as a beneficiary is not clear. If,
however, the compact be viewed not as a simple contract but as a contract between
sovereign states, with a status in international law, its supremacy over subse-
quent state statutes inconsistent with it is explicable as the supremacy of inter-
national over municipal law. The rule of international law forbids one signatory
acting alone, unless surrounding circumstances would make enforcement in-
equitable,30 to abrogate or alter the force of its treaties.31 While American courts
have not assumed jurisdiction to enforce against Congress its international law
obligation not to alter or renounce its duties under a treaty unreasonably, the
judicial position of parties to compacts is different. In the first place, states are
under constitutional prohibition against passing laws which impair the obliga-
tion of contracts; Congress faces no such limitation. In the second place, unlike
cases involving treaties, necessary parties to a compact are available to the
court unless the Eleventh Amendment intervenes. Finally, as a practical matter,
the sovereignty of an American state is less impressive and deters judicial inter-
ference less than the sovereignty of a foreign nation. In the case of compacts
creating "political" rather than contractual rights of beneficiaries, then, an
individual's or a signatory state's legal standing to complain of the operation
of statutes inconsistent with such compacts is best explained as an adaptation,
under the obligation of contracts clause, of the international law rule, judicially
enforceable between states if not between nations, which forbids unilateral abro-
gation of treaties.
The second major difference between treaties and compacts is that the
latter are much less immune than treaties from judicial review. Although it is
generally acknowledged that there are limits to the scope of the national treaty-
making power, it is exercised in an atmosphere of relative freedom from judicial
interference which makes of it, in fact if not in theory, an extension of the federal
power over domestic affairs. 32 But if treaties are something more than statutes,
under a treaty or otherwise, or the rights of signatories, but it does conclude the rights
of individuals insofar as the rights are governed by municipal law. Cf. The Ship Rose,
36 Ct. Clms. 290, 301 (1901). Potter, Relative Authority of International Law and National
Law in the United States (1925) 19 Ams. J. INT. LAW 315. This rule, still correct for the
United States, has been revised by the exercise, on consent of the parties, of international
judicial powers by the Permanent Court of International Justice. HUDSON, Tn Woaw
COURT, 1921-1934 (1934); HUDSON, THE PEass NmTr COURT OP INTERNATIONAL Jusrxcn
,(1935); STATUTE Am RuLEs, P. C. I. J. (1922), Art. 36(c). For cases of the application of
these powers, see Factory at Chorzow, P. C. I. J. Series A, No. 17 (1928); The Peter Pazamy
Univ., P. C. I. J., Series A/B, No. 61 (1933); Minority Schools in Albania, P. C. I. J.,
Series A/B, No. 64 (1935); Hyde, World Court Interprets another International Agreement
(1935) 29 Ams. J. INT. LAW 479.
30. 2 HYDE, INT. LA W (1922) 81-90.
31. The jurisdiction of American courts over claims arising under compacts is analogous
to that of the World Court, both as to rights considered "political" and those held to be
justiciable under national treaties. Cf. note 29, supra.
32. Cf. Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 242-243 (U. S. 1872); The Trade Mark Cases, 100
U. S. 82, 99 (1879); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258 (1890); Missouri v. Holland, 252
U. S. 416, 433 (1920). Anderson, Treaties as Domestic Law (1935) 29 Ams. 3. INT. LAW
472; Potter, Treaty Making Power of the United States (1934) 28 Am. J. INT. LAW 496;
Stoke, The Constitution and International Labor Conventions (1932) 30 Mxcit. L. RlEv.
531; Wheeler, Treaty Making Power of the United States (1908) 17 YA=E L. J. 151.
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interstate compacts are not. Despite their novel overtones of international law,
compacts will be subjected to the constitutional restraints imposed on other state
legislation. 3
Enforcement involves another quasi-international problem in the law of inter-
state compacts. There are three possible forms of suit under a compact: an
action against individuals, at the instance either of the state or of another indi-
vidual; an action by an individual against a state; and finally an action of
a state against a signatory state. The first action presents no difficulties; com-
pacts have been repeatedly held to determine the rights of individuals. 4 The
second encounters the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.a5 The third,
where the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the parties, encounters the con-
fusion of authority as to the enforcement of judgments against a state.O The
Supreme Court has asserted its capacity to issue judgments against a state, and
to command their execution, even ordering a judicial sale of properties held by
a state for proprietary purposes.3 7 The historic rebellions against decisions of
the Supreme Court leave the law uncertain as to the machinery with which the
court could enforce its decree directly against a state, or require Congress to
help it in enforcement. 38 Chief Justice White declared that Congress' power to
33. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hlnderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 25 P. (2d)
187 (1933), appeal dismissed, 291 U. S. 650 (1934). (1934) 34 Cor. L. Rav. 169; (1934)
2 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 242; (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. 468; (1934) 43 Yaa. L. J. 842.
34. Burton's Lessee v. Williams, 3 Wheat. 525 (U. S. 1818); Marlatt v. Silk, 11 Pet. 1
(U. S. 1837); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140 (1911); Kansas City v.
Fairfax Drainage District, 34 F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S.
722 (1930).
35. After Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (U. S. 1793), and the controversy it aroused,
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890),
made the immunity of a sate from suit by an individual altogether unequivocal. See
Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565, 600 (1916); (1903) 17 YA.E L..]. 288.
36. Contrast Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U. S. 1860); Taylor v. Taintor, 16
Wall. 366, 370 (U. S. 1872), with the line of cases: Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 (1882) ;
United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211 (1890); United States v. Michigan, 190
U. S. 379 (1903); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904); Virginia v. West
Virginia, 246 U. S. 565 (1918); cases are collected in Mr. Justice White's disent in South
Dakota v. North Carolina, supra, at 331. Coleman, The State as Defendant (1917) 31
HARv. L. Rav. 210; Long, Enforcement of Judgments against a State (1916) 4 VA. L. Ray.
157; Powell, Coercing a State (1918) 17 MiacH. L. Rav. 1.
37. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904). Granted that the jursdic-
tion of the Supreme Court over suits between states includes the power to issue proce3
to enforce judgment [Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565, 591 (1918); Wayman v.
Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 22 (U. S. 1825)], the question in each case, once a proper suit has
been recognized, is a choice among remedies. It is not yet settled what remedies other
than execution against property held in a non-governmental capacity are available against
states as defendants, in actions for money damages. Cf. Mferiwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S.
472 (1880). But see South Dakota v. North Carolina, supra, at 321; (1918) 31 HAnv. L.
Rav. 1158.
38. Chief Justice Marshall's mandamus, in United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch. 115 (U. S.
1809), provoked a conflict between state militia and a posse raised by a federal marshaL
Cf. 1 WARREn, THE SUPRExIM CoU' IN UnM STATES HisroRY (1928) 366-399, 541-564,
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consent to compacts implied a plenary power to see to their enforcement.8 0 But
his positive authority has never been tested, and, given the surviving strength
of the concept of state sovereignty, there can be no assurance that compacts are
judicially enforceable against states without serious friction. Perhaps the growing
body of interstate law will compromise the dilemma by borrowing the rule of
international law that courts will not take jurisdiction to enforce a treaty until
the legislature has enacted laws to make judgment effective.40
INDUSTRIAL REGULATION BY COMPACT: OIL
A recently popular method of governmental regulation of industry, especially
for industries chronically maladjusted, is to protect and institutionalize industrial
trade associations as "code authorities," under more or less extensive govern-
mental supervision. If, in testing the Guffey Coal Bill, the Supreme Court holds
the power of Congress to regulate commerce an inadequate basis for such a
program of regulation, action by interstate compact will be the only way, short
of constitutional amendment, for achieving the kind of detailed control over
business enterprise with which the federal government has lately been experi-
menting.
The utility of a compact between producing states as a device for solving
problems of industrial control can be conveniently studied in the experience of
the oil industry,41 which raises the general issues of power and policy suggested
by all experiments at regulating industry in this familiar "code" pattern.
a. Oil Conservation
The problem of wasteful drilling and overproduction of oil is in large part a
consequence of the American law of oil and gas.42 The law is that a man owns
where the resistance of the Federal Government, of Georgia, Pennsylvania and Virginia to
various decisions of the court is described.
39. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565, 601 (1918). Powell, supra note 36, at 1S.
40. Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (U. S. 1829); United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet.
51 (U. S. 1833); Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32 (U. S. 1869); United States v, Rauscher, 119
U. S. 407 (1886); 2 HYDE, INT. LAW (1922) 57-59, and 51-57 (references there listed).
41. The oil industry is a timely and practical illustration of the place of the compact In
industrial regulation. A compact has been long and vigorously advocated as a solution
for the difficulties of the industry; and the first industrial code ever enacted by compact now
nominally controls the legislative policy of six oil producing states. Two others will
probably soon adhere. Cf. p. 337, and notes 64, 65, infra; Stocking, Stabilization of the
Oil Industry (1932) 23 Am. Ec. Rav. (Supp.) 55; discussion by Fetter, ibid., at 81; Pound,
Self-Government Succeeds in Oil (1935) 156 A-_. MoNTH. 121.
42. Mautner, Petroleum (1932) 7 INDEx (Stockholm) 1, 19. The usual legal discussion
of the question starts by assuming that the problem of the oil industry is "overproduction."
Two propositions support this premise: (1) that the law of property fails to permit an
adjustment of output to fluctuations in the demand for oil; (2) that competitive pressure
prevents such an adjustment. The two themes, technical and economic, are frequently con-
fused. Cf. Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production (1931) 41 YALE
L. J. 33, 35. Representative restatements of the economic doctrine are to be found In
STOCXMG, THE On INDusTRY AND THE COMPEETIv SYSTEMr (1925); ELY, op. cit. supra
note 1; Ford, Controlling Oil Production (1932) 30 MicH. L. REV. 1170; Mautner, supra;
Marshall and Meyers, supra; Marshall and Meyers, Two Years of Proration (1933) 42
YALE L. J. 702.
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all the oil and gas he can pump out of his ground.4 3 If one well in a field is
operating, every other property owner or lessee44 must extract, whatever the
price of oil may be, or his share of oil from the pool will be drained through the
sands to his neighbor's well. In getting the oil out of the ground quickly, the
pool's lifting force-the pressure of the natural gas suspended in the oil reser-
voir-is dissipated and ultimate recovery from the pool reduced.
The most serious of the physical wastes of oil could be eliminated if each
underground oil pool were exploited as a unit,45 with existing surface property
rights exchanged for shares in the common enterprise, according to any one of
several suggested plans.46 While no state has as yet fully tested the constitu-
tionality of compulsory unitization, the survival before the courts of other exer-
cises of state police power in the interest of oil conservation 47 indicates that a
43. The legal treatment of the rule is familiar. Cases are collected in Marshall and
Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 33, 41; Ford, Con-
trolling the Production of Oil (1932) 30 MscH. L. Rxv. 1170, 1173-1175; Veasey, Law of
Oil and Gas (1920) 18 Mrics. L. Ray. 445, 456.
44. See MEamL, CovENurrs I.zsm r On. m,D GAs LaE'ss (1926); 'Marshall and
Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production (1931) 41 YArx L. J. 33, 47; ELY, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 10.
45. That unitization is the agreed ideal of those interested in eliminating the physical
wastes of oil and gas production, see ELY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 9; Srocrnc, Tim OIL
IIMUSTRy xAn = CoasPEnvE Sysr=ax (1925) ch. 7-12, 311; HAt-uoor, o: U nzrrrzio.
or OiL Pooas (Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Ass'n) (1930); Bennett, Curtailment and Valor-
ization in the Petroleum Oil and Gas Industry (1933) 6 So. CarP. L. REV. 301, (1934) 7
So. CALir. L. RLv. 183; Ford, Controlling Oil Production (1932) 30 Mici. L. RMy. 1170,
1202; German, Compulsory Unit Operation (1932) 20 CIw. L. RLV. 111; Symnpoc 4ru
(1930) TRAas. A. I. M. E. 34, 80, 105; Mapes, Seminole & Unit Operation (1928) Am..
REP., Mm-CozN-rnmax On A= GAs ASS'N 14; Marshall & Meyers, supra note 43, at 59-65;
Marshall & Meyers, Two Years of Proration (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 702, 734; Merrill, Stabil-
ization in the Oil Industry and Due Process of Law (1930) 3 So. C,=. L. Ra'. 396;
Stocking, Oil Proration (1933) 9 JoUR. LArm .n PuB. UT=n. EcO:.. 135, 144.
46. See Tam HAmBoox ON U=nrzA'oq or O. PooLs (1930) of the Mid-Continent Oil
and Gas Association for sample contracts of unitization schemes and details of several
such programs in operation.
47. Discussion of existing statutes regulating oil production in the interest of preventing
physical and economic waste, is to be found in ELY, op. cit. supra note 1, ch. v. and
Appendix I; Ford, supra note 42, at 1178-1202. Statutes have been upheld which control
almost every phase of extractive technique, above ground and underground. Statutes aiming
to prevent "economic" waste are on the statute books of several states; but their consti-
tutionality is doubtful: Ka. Rav. STAT. ArN. (Supp. 1933) §§ 601-611; Li. G=.. ST,%T.
(Dart, 1932) §§ 4757-4765; OKLA. STAT. ANY. (Harlow, 1931) §§ 11565-1156S; GE:.. Lw%
Taxss 1933, ch. 165, p. 422; Macmillan v. Railroad Commisson, 51 F. (2d) 4CO (W. D.
Tem. 1931); People's Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 1 F. Supp. 361 (E. D. Tex. 1932); Danciger
Oil Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 236 (N. i. Tex. 1933). Two bases viz., protection of the
co-owners' interests in the common supply of oil and gas, and conservation of a natural
resource, are intermingled in the decisions as equally effective justifications for regulating
physical waste. Comment (1932) 45 HARv. L. Rav. 557; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 (1911); Champlin Refining Co. v. Comnaission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932);
People v. Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 Pac. 717 (1930); Manufacture's Gas & Oil
Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57 N. E. 912 (1900); Oklahoma Natural
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plan of unitization might well be upheld if the limitations placed on the use of
property are so convincingly directed to the protection of the private interests
of surface holders and of the public interest in the prevention of waste that any
price consequences of the regulation can be treated as incidents of the legisla-
ture's primary and legitimate purposes, 48 and if the rights of individual owners
are not arbitrarily or unfairly allocated. 4 9 If constitutional, unitization and
other measures in the interests of physical efficiency would achieve the purposes
of a conservation program.
The chief objection to the compact as a vehicle for imposing a policy of uni-
tization on the oil industry is that it is unnecessary. Independent action by
individual states can secure successful unitization, both legally and practically.
For a program of unitization cannot be inhibited by the fear, common to most
experiments in industrial regulation, that reform undertaken in a single state
would be weakened by the pressure of competition from states which do not enact
the same program; state unitization would almost certainly place producers
in the state at a competitive advantage, not a disadvantage.50
To fulfill a conservation program by regulation short of unitization, inde-
pendent state action would again seem more practical than procedure by com-
pact. A compact is rigid and difficult to amend, repeal or supplant. Rigidity
is an advantage in certain of the fields where the compact has been suggested,51
but a greater latitude of discretion and experiment is desirable in oil conservation
in order to allow comparison of the cost and effectiveness of different programs,
and perhaps to check over-burdensome regulations.
Almost the only virtue of the compact as an instrument of conservation is
its effectiveness as an agency of propaganda for accelerating state action. In
Gas Co. v. State, 47 Okla. 601, 150 Pac. 475 (1915); and see Canadian River Gas Co. v.
Terrell, 4 F. Supp. 222 (W. D. Tex. 1933); (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 377.
48. Marrs v. City of Oxford, 32 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); cert. denied, 280
U. S. 563, 573 (1929); Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Permits and Leases (on the public
Domain) 53 I. D. 386 (1931); Raymond Barber 53 I. D. 646 (1932); Associated 011 Co,
51 L. D. 241, 308 (1925). Cf. Higgins v. California Petroleum Co., 109 Cal. 304, 41 Pac,
1087 (1895); 46 STAT. 1523, 30 U. S. C. A. § 226 (1930).
49. The doctrine that surface owners deserve an equitable share of the resources of
the pool, to be technically determined, seems well established. Bandini v. Superior Court,
284 U. S. 8 (1931); Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932); Russell
v. Walker, 160 Okla. 145, 15 P. (2d) 114 (1932); Wilcox v. State, 162 Okla. 89, 19 P. (2d)
347 (1933). The details of finding such an equitable share should not seriously Interfere
with the legality of a unitization statute. Report (1928) 54 A. B. A. Rep. 739; Hardwlcke,
Legal Aspects of Gas Conservation (1931) 207 Am. PEr. INsT. BULL. 23; Ford, Controlling
Oil Production (1932) 30 M1cH. L. Rav. 1170, 1202-1210, bibliography 1209-1210. For
complete bibliography, see HANDBOOK oN UNITIZATION OF OM POOLS (1930) (Mid-Continent
Oil & Gas Ass'n) 137.
50. Lewis estimates that unitization would mean an increase of profits of 102Y% for
one typical pool studied, and of almost 509 in another. Lewis, Comparison of Competitive
and Unit Operations in Cromwell and Seminole City Pools (1930) HANDBOOK ON UNITIZATION
Or On. POOLS 35, 54-55, 63.
51. Notably commercial law, the uniformity of uniform statutes, interstate crime en-
forcement, tax reform, and perhaps labor law. Cf. Wigmore, Report (1922) 31 NAT. CoN7.
Comz. Uxu. STATE LAws 297, 301-302, 313-323.
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advance of practical experience with the recently enacted conservation compact,
therefore, it is difficult to see how cooperation can secure results beyond the
reach of the states legislating independently.
b. Proration for Price Fixing
But the proponents of oil regulation are not satisfied with programs of con.
servation, whether achieved by federal, state, or interstate authority; their chief
interest is in "adjusting production to demand," and in eliminating "cut-throat"
competition.5 2 To justify this kind of restriction scheme, it is argued that even
if compulsory unitization of oil pools and other regulations of technique elimin-
ated the more important physical wastes consequent on the law of oil and gas,
"economic waste" would continue to demoralize the industry and require limita-
tion of output in the public interest. "An unrestricted program of mere scien-
tific exploitation might so increase the supply of crude oil as to further demoral-
ize the market.... Proration must be superimposed upon unit operation to pre-
vent unrestrained flush production from leading to waste."' r3
Such a scheme of proration in the interest of industrial stability, however de-
fined, may be vulnerable to legal objection under the due process clauses of the
constitution. Proration has been upheld only as an exercise of the state police
power appropriate to the legitimate ends of preventing physical waste and pro-
tecting the property rights of adjoining owners;s statutes authorizing proration
to prevent "economic" waste, and to protect prices equivalent to "actual values,"
have not yet been considered before the Supreme Court. It has been strongly
hinted by lower courts, however, that a state lacks the power to restrict pro-
52. The two objectives behind most such schemes for direct regulatory control of industry
are reform and recovery. This type of control is supposed to facilitate reform by elim-
inating competitive trade practices; recovery is to be stimulated by permitting price rises
and preventing future price fluctuations, the inarticulate premise being that fluctuations in
individual prices are in some way concerned with the fluctuations in general prices which
characterize the trade cycle. Cf. Pribrarn, Controlled Competition and the Organization of
American Industry (1935) 49 Q. J. Ecosr. 371.
A clear and decisive popular exposition of the economic criticism of these schemes is
included in PiGou, Ecoxomcs 3N PRALcricn (1935) ch. VI. See also Wxmxrnv, Tnr Aszo-
CIATIONS AND INDUSTr= Co.rMor (1934); EcoNo ics or Tmx Rxcovmzy Pr0oA m (Harvard
Economists, 1934) ch. III; RoBaINs, THE GRmAT DEPREssioN (1935) Ch. VII; Hotelling,
The Economics of an Exhaustible Resource (1931) 39 J. PoLr. Eco:. 137; Lavington,
Monopoly and Business Stability (1926) 6 EcoNocA 135; Pigou, Stabilization in Particular
Industries, in PiGou AND RoBmTsoN, EcoNome EssAYs ANm ADDngxssc (1931) 34-44. For
a typical statement of the intellectual position in support of a contrary view, see HAdAmzon;
AND WRiGHT, A WAY OF ORDEnR FOR Brru .uous CoAL (1928).
53. Marshall and Meyers, Two Years of Proration (1933) 42 YA=z L. J. 702, 734. The
economics of the argument has been criticized. The premise behind the statement is that
production would be carried beyond the point at which it "paid." For definitions of what
is meant by "paying" or economic production, see AARSHAL, PanT. or ECon.-. (8th ed. 1930)
374-377; MEADE, RATE OF Ir. n A Paon. STATE (1933) 33-35, and note 3, at p. 35; and,
more generally, Hardy, dissenting, HAnTo AND WRIGHT, A WAY Or Omm ron BrrUi.ous
COAL (1928) 312-318; Kaldor, Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity (1935) 2 Econ-
oincA (N. S.) 33, 50.
54. Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932).
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duction if the purpose or the obvious effect of the scheme is to raise or control
prices. 55
While the implications of Nebbia v. New York"0 have not yet been judicially
developed, it seems clear that the case did not so expand the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as to nullify it as a check on price-fixing economic
experiments by the states. The rule of the case restates the due process prin-
ciple in a simple, but not therefore inherently less inclusive form: "Price control,
like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discrim-
inatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt."61
Adjectives like "arbitrary" and "discriminatory" do not narrow the scope of the
due process clause as an instrument of judicial review. And the thesis with which
Mr. Justice Roberts distinguishes the cycle of cases turning on the concept of
"affectation with a public interest"58 does not substantially weaken the force
of those holdings as instances of "arbitrary" and "discriminatory" price-fixing,
and therefore as particularized threats to state price fixing programs less appealing
than the New York milk statute. It may be as easy to persuade the Supreme
Court that a price fixing scheme is arbitrary or irrelevant to a legitimate legislative
purpose as to persuade it that the business in which prices were fixed is not
affected with a public interest. The test which will dispose of an oil stabiliza-
tion plan, whether enacted by an individual state or by interstate compact, will
be a comparison betveen its reasonableness, in the judgment of the court, and
the reasonableness on the one hand of statutes providing for fixing milk prices,
grain elevator charges, insurance agents' fees;59 and, on the other, of statutes
setting wages in packing plants, prices for gasoline and theatre ticket broker-
age, rates in employment agencies, and the terms of an ice industry.00
But if such a program can survive attack under the Fifth or the Fourteenth
Amendments, proration for this purpose cannot be successfully established as a
practical matter by single states acting alone; and a restriction on the total
production of oil, or even a regulation of its price in interstate commerce, seems
of doubtful validity under contemporary judicial definitions of Congressional
power over interstate commerce. But an interstate compact would permit the
55. People's Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 1 F. Supp. 361, 365 (E. D. Tex. 1932); Macmillan
v. Commission; Danciger v. Smith, both supra note 47.
56. 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
57. Ibid. at 539.
58. Ibid. at 536; Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522 (1923); Tyson v.
Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1928); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928); Williams v. Standard
Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929).
59. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391 (1894);
Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards, 183 U. S. 79 (1901); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis,
233 U. S. 389 (1914); Margolin v. United States, 269 U. S. 93 (1925); O'Gorman v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251 (1932). And
see Public Service Comm. v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U. S. 130 (1933); Hegeman
Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163 (1934).
60. Cases cited supra note 58; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921);
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,
274 U. S. 1 (1927); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932); cf. Pennsylvania
Coal Co.'v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922).
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states to establish, and the federal government to cooperate in,61 a unified admin-
istrative scheme, applying a single articulated policy for oil to the entire produc-
tion phase of the industry. Such a general program of regulation could be
most efficiently administered by a single board, including representatives of all
the interested states. The creation of such an agency might raise anew the
issue of invalid delegation of legislative power; C2 but the difficulty does not
seem insuperable as a matter of draftsmanship or administration. There is,
however, one substantial generic weakness of the compact as an agency of in-
dustrial regulation. Compact-making is a diplomatic process requiring unanimity
among the compacting states. The need for unanimity puts a premium on com-
promise;6 3 the results which emerge from a compact conference are often dis-
appointingly neutral, especially where the issues provoke a clash of interest and
opinion.
The history of the recently enacted oil conservation compact 4 strikingly illus-
trates this inherent weakness of the compact procedure. When authorizing the
negotiation of the compact, several of the state legislatures indicated that they
looked to the compact for price raising and restriction of output.P As it was
61. Representation from the federal government is usually invited at compact confer-
ences; and complementary federal legislation for interstate commerce phases of the regu-
latory problem offers an effective medium for unifying the compact program. Cf. 45 SrT.
1057, 43 U. S. C. A. § 617 (1928) (Boulder Dam legislation); 49 STAT. (ch. 18), 15 U. S.
C. A. § - (1935) (denial to interstate commerce of oil produced in excess of state quotas).
The analogy of the Webb-Kenyon Act [37 STAT. 699 (1913)] has also been urged as a
model for federal assistance to a compact policy.
62. The issue has been thoroughly canvassed in the recent literature. See Sharp, Class ial
American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers" (1935) 2 U. or Cm. L. Ray. 385; Com-
ment (1935) 20 IA. L. Ry. 636; Notes (1935) 23 CAn'. L. Rrv. 435; (1935) 33 Mzicu.
L. REv. 952; (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 700.
63. Soule, Back to States Rights (1935) Harper's Magazine, 484, 490. A clear and
incisive analysis of the practical utilities and disutilities of the interstate compact in general
is presented by Prof. Freund, Concurring Memorandum (1921) 31 NAT. CosrP. Coi=.
UN=. STATE LAWS 484, 490.
64. Okla. Sess. Laws, 1935, 240, 242; N. M. Laws, 1935, 1, 312; Kans. Iaws, 1935, 304,
305. Record of ratification by Texas, California, Michigan, Arkans-as, Colorado, and
Illinois, all parties to the compact, is not yet available, although Illinois, Colorado, and
Texas have already acted favorably. The history of interstate cooperation in the regulation
of the oil industry is outlined in ELY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 18-25. Secretary Wilbur
proposed operations along this line in April, 1929. The Federal Oil Conservation Board
had urged a compact as early as 1926; the Oil States Advisory Committee repeated the
suggestion in 1931, and a bill authorizing interstate compacts of this type was propo-ed
[H.R. 12076, 72d Cong. 1st Sess.] in 1933.
65. Okla. Sess. Laws, 1935, 240; N. Al. Laws, 1935, 1. Both legislatures followed the
formula devised by Secretary Wilbur and the Oil Advisory Board Ed. ELY, op. cit. supra
note 1, ch. VIII; ELY, PROPOSED INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR OIL COsNSErVATIO. (1933);
Compacts Preferred (1934) 7 STATE Gov'T 140] in suggesting a fact-finding interstate
compact commission, which would estimate the demand for oil and draw up quotas for
each state; the federal government was to reduce the import of oil; to control the with-
dawal of oil from storage; and to prevent the Shipment in interstate commerce of oil
produced in excess of state quotas [d. note 611.
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signed, the compact denounced monopoly, price fixing and "regimentation," 00
and confined its scope to declaring the obligation of the signatory states to enact
legislation on specified technical oil conservation problems. There is no positive
commitment which might be enforced against a defaulting state; the compact fails
even to adopt standards to which legislation adopted under it might be compared.
Despite these difficulties of negotiation, however, the compact is a practical
compromise with current judicial concepts of interstate commerce, and remains
the simplest and most promising of available techniques for imposing a scheme
of detailed regulation upon an industry confined geographically to a manageable
number of states.
COMxPACTS FOR LABOR LEGISLATION
The most active recent application of the interstate compact device has been
accomplished by a crusade, spreading from the New England states, to reenact
the labor ideals of the N. R. A., and to improve and unify labor legislation in
general through a series of compacts on hours of labor, fair minimum wages for
women and children, elimination of child labor, and other issues in the field of
labor legislation. 67
The resources of the compact as an instrument for the unification of labor
laws are varied and promising. A state acting alone cannot progress far with
this kind of industrial regulation, even when its statutes neither impose a quan-
titatively serious cost burden, nor require a prohibitively difficult administra-
tive supervision of business affairs. One of the first barriers to welfare legislation
is the movement of mobile industries to states of lower labor standards. By
establishing regional uniformity of standards, compacts can improve the effi-
cacy of the modest labor laws thus far operative. But insofar as ultimate labor
markets are not regional but national, progress by compact would require adher-
ence of many states to the labor compacts and give a special advantage to those
which failed to adhere. The process would be almost as slow as amendment to
the Constitution. The interstate compact for labor legislation promises to be
useful in eliminating differences between the costs of workers' welfare only in
states of the same region or the same industrial class, and further, perhaps, in
stimulating legislative action and experiment in a field still stagnant.
But even in the sphere of labor regulation to which it is most adaptable, the
compact, like other labor legislation, is narrowly limited in its possibilities of im-
66. Okla. Sess. Laws, 1935, 242, 243.
67. REPORTS OF THE MASS. COMMISSION ON INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1934-1935); INTER-
STATE COMPACTS IN =a F=D OF LABOR LEGisLATIoN (New Hampshire Commission on
Interstate Compacts Affecting Labor and Industries, 1935); Proceedings, Interstate Labor
Conference, June 28, 1935; Johnson, Legislative Levees (1935) 8 STATE Gov'T 151; Johnson,
Interstate Compacts Affecting Labor (1934) 24 Am. LAB. Lo. REV. 71; Parkman, By
Compact (1934) 7 STATE Gov'T 65; Parkman, A Single Standard (1934) 7 STATE GOV'T 141;
Concord Compact (1934) 7 STATE Gov'T 174; Mills, States Turn to Compacts (Sept. 4, 1935)
CEnMISN' ScrMcE MONITOR, Magazine, 4. It has been suggested that an interstate agree-
ment about labor conditions may be a treaty rather than a compact, and thus absolutely
prohibited by the Constitution. Comment (1935) 10 ST. JoHn's L. Rxv. 93, 99.
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proving the standard of living. It, too, will defeat its own ends if it unduly in-
creases the operating costs of industry and thus causes unemploymentS
Yet the use of the compact in the field of labor legislation has so far been
encouraging if not brilliantly successful. The first of the proposed series of
compacts on labor problems has been signed by representatives of seven north-
eastern states; two legislatures have already ratified it, and Congress will un-
doubtedly add its sanction during the next session, making the compact binding,
if otherwise constitutional, in the states which ratify. 9 This compact obligates
the signatory states to enact legislation embodying the uniform labor standards
of the agreement. Title HI declares against "unfair or oppressive" wage rates
for women and minors. Determination of such rates is left to individual states,
working through their established administrative agencies. The latter are given
the assistance of temporary special wage boards and a permanent, unpaid State
Compact Commission representing industry, labor and the public, which is to
supervise the administration of the law by the state's regular civil servants and
the ad hoc wage boards, and, further, is to cooperate with an Interstate Commis-
sion authorized by the Compact. The Interstate Commission is to be a fact
finding, supervisory, conciliatory body, making reports of its investigations into
activities and problems under the compact, and recommending settlements for
any questions which the states bring before it. The compact is carefully drafted.
But the minimum wage legislation it recommends, though not quite so concrete
in its standard as the statute declared unconstitutional in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital,70 faces the barrier of that holding. It remains to be seen how generally
the Supreme Court will follow its recent cases in permitting a state to select any
plausible theory it chooses as the basis for a policy of industrial regulation.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO STATUTES
The first sentence of Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United
States declares, "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State." Despite the ex-
plicit inclusion of "public acts," it is only within recent years that the Supreme
Court has been willing to take jurisdiction of a case on the ground that a state
68. DOUGLAS, TBEORY or WAGES (1934) Chap. 12, 13, pp. 252-258, 493, 501; Hiczs,
THEORY or WAGES (1932) 136-229, 179-197; PiGoU, THEORY or UzE ZPLOrC.MmT (1933)
252-262, 293-295; Clay, Public Regulation of Wages in Great Britain (1929) 39 Ec. J. 323;
Marschak, Wages (1935) 15 ENcYc. Soc. SciaucEs 291, bibliography 318; Mms, Prices,
Costs, and Productivity (1934) 53 BUL.. NAT. BUR. Ec. Risr.cCH; (1935) 56 id.; Robbins,
Economic Effects of Variations Hours of Labor (1929) 39 Ec. J. 25; Robertson, Wage
Grumbles in Econ onc FiA xmrs (1931) 42; and see also HAinrTo.im M ,u x- Tim CO: rOL
OF WAGES (1927) 109.
69. The compact has been signed by representatives of IMaine, New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania. Massachusetts and
New Hampshire have already ratified. Acts and Resolves, Mass. 1934, Ch. 383, p. 554; cf.
LNTEsTATE CoMPAcTS n- r Fmr.z or LA OR LEGisr.ATion, supra note 67, at 42-43.
70. 261 U. S. 525 (1923). Sixteen states now have statutes of this type. See Comment
(1935) 10 ST. JoHN's L. Rrv. 93, note 8, 94.
1935]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
court had denied full faith and credit to the statute of a sister state.1 This long
refusal to acknowledge a constitutional issue affords a striking example of the
court's reluctance to become arbiter in the field of conflict of laws.2 Yet tech-
nically the refusal could not have been justified if a second sentence had not been
added to the section, a sentence which was open to the interpretation that the
full faith and credit clause was not self-executing. The added sentence pro-
vides, "And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
Pursuant to this power, Congress early prescribed rules for the authentication
and proving of acts, records and judicial proceedings, and declared that "the
said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such
faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they
have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are
or shall be taken."3 No provision, however, declared what effect, if any, should
be given to authenticated public acts. Thus, from the omission by Congress,4
it was assumed that the clause should have no bearing on the extra-territorial
operation of state statutes and that, despite the intention of the framers of the
Constitution, local policy in the forum state should continue to dominate the
rules of comity except in the case of a claim reduced to judgment.5
Under this interpretation if an action arose from a statute in state A and
was sought to be enforced in state B, the courts of B normally would apply the
statute of A because of the rules of conflict of laws. But if there were a local
policy or statute in B adverse to the law of A, the statute of A would not be given
effect. 6 The only way in which the plaintiff could enforce his statutory rights
would be to secure a judgment in state A and then to sue on it in B. In the
1. Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (1928)
12 Miu x. L. REv. 439; Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts
(1929) 24 ILL. L. Rxv. 383. At 398-99 the author suggests that the proper ground for
the result in Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307 (U. S. 1866) was that the New York court
had denied full faith and credit to the Illinois statute.
2. Dodd, Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict
of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. R-v. 533; See Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch
of Constitutional Law (1931) 15 Mixx. L. REv. 161. Also Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S.
171, 176 (1916). Comment (1918) 13 ILr.. L. Rrv. 43, 54.
3. 1 STAT. 122 (1790). Costigan, History of Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution
(1904) 4 Cor. L. REV. 470.
4. See BikI6, The Silence of Congress (1927) 41 HARv. L. REv. 200.
S. Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REV. 371, 374.
6. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J.
736, presenting the view that policy alone explains results that do not fit Story's maxim of
territorialty. For obvious objections to the defense of public policy see Goodrich, Publi
Policy in the Law of Conflicts (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 156. Nutting, Suggested Limitations
of the Public Policy Doctrine (1935) 19 MixN. L. Rxv. 196. The present tendency Is
towards allowance of comity unless the action "in its nature offends our sense of justice
or menaces the public welfare." Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99,
at 110, 120 N. E. 198, at 201. RESTATEMENT, CoNruicr or LAWS (1934) § 612, declares
that a "strong" public policy is a defense. Despite protests to the contrary, on numerous
occasions the Supreme Court has determined the policy of a state. See for example A. T.
& S. F. Ry. Co. v. Nichols, 264 U. S. 348, 353 (1924); Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15 (1917).
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latter suit the adverse policy of B would not be available as a defense 1 By vir-
tue of the act of Congress the judgment sued on would be vulnerable in B only
on the same grounds as in A,8 namely for fraud or lack of jurisdiction, unless
perchance the claim fell within the fold of well recognized exceptions to be dis-
cussed later.9 But if the plaintiff could not serve the defendant in A or secure
jurisdiction by some other valid means, he would be without remedy. And
even if he were successful in A, a suit would be necessary in B. To avoid these
hardships and the uncertainty and wide diversity of results reached under such
principles, lawyers occasionally resorted to the full faith and credit clause.10
Success was slight until in 1887 Chief Justice Waite declared, obiter, in Chicago
& Alton Rr. v. Wiggins Ferry Co. that "without doubt" the clause "implies that
the public acts of every state shall be given the same effect by the courts of
another state that they have by law and usage at home."" This arbitrary con-
clusion has since been followed almost without question, the subsequent cases
indicating that the clause is considered to be self-executing. '
With the disappearance of this technical reason for distinction between judg-
ment and statute, it might be supposed that treatment under the clause would
-be the same. Yet the fact is otherwise. Actually the Supreme Court has nar-
rowly confined the application of the clause according to the subject covered
by the statutes, so that at the present time, despite the recent trend to-
ward review by the Supreme Court, only a few types of statutes are entitled to
full faith and credit.13 If the subject matter of the statute is such that the
7. Thus a foreign judgment on a contract must be enforced in the state where the con-
tract was made even though the contract there was illegal and void under a statute.
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908). Similarly, a foreign judgment in an action
which by statute was not maintainable in the state of the forum must be enforced. Kenney
v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411 (1920). And a foreign judgment on a domectic judgment
against which the domestic statute of limitations had run similarly is entitled to full faith
and credit. Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 (1928). Opposite results might have been
reached, however, if in the foreign suits it had been argued that the domestic statutes were
entitled to full faith and credit. Comment (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 464. Cf. Anglo-American
Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373 (1903).
8. Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234 (U. S. 1818); Fauntleroy v. Lune, 210 U. S.
230 (1908).
9. See infra notes 28-35.
10. For example, in Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 (1881). By its silence
the court, it would seem, impliedly assented to the view that the clause applied to public
acts. See also the statement of Chief Justice Waite in Chicago & Alton Rr. Co. v. Wiggins
Ferry Company, 108 U. S. 18, 22 (1882). And see Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307
(U. S. 1866).
11. 119 U. S. 615 (1887), at 622. The supposition is thought to be fals-e. Corwin,
The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, supra note 5, at 386.
12. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55 (1909); followed in El Paso & North-
eastern Railway Company v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87 (1909). Langmaid, The Full Faith
and Credit Required for Public Acts, supra note 1, at 389-90.
13. Such acts include (a) stockholder's liability statutes: Converse v. Hamilton, 224
U. S. 243 (1912); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1935); (b) Charters and by-laws
of beneficial fraternal organizations: Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green,
237 U. S. 531 (1915); Modem Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544 (1925);
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clause is applicable, the policy of the forum state can be no bar and the statute
is entitled to the same foreign effect as by law and usage it would receive at
home.14 The test most recently employed by the Supreme Court in deter-
mining whether the clause is applicable to a given statute involves the balancing
of interests. If the forum state has sufficient interest in the subject matter, its
law may be applied,15 but if the foreign state has a superior interest full faith
and credit must be given to its statute.' 6 If the conflicting interests are of equal
weight, the statute of either state is applicable, the party who invokes the clauses
having the burden of proving a superior foreign interest.17 Since these interests
are computable by no precise method, the balance will depend on prevailing
notions of policy and the state with the greater interest will be the state that, for
reasons later discussed, should have the sole control.
In this manner the unqualified mandate of the clause, that statutes are en-
titled to full faith and credit, has been limited. Thus, where conflicting statutes
are concerned, the problem, under the interest test, is one governed not by
Article IV, Section 1,18 but by the limitations on legislative jurisdiction imposed
by the &ivileges and immunities clause of Section 2,19 by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment"0 and by other constitutional provisions which curtail state power.2 1 For
if the forum court applies its own act to subject matter in which another state
with a different statute takes a superior interest, such application is held to be
(c) employer's liability statutes (at least by dictum): Tennessee Coal, Iron & Rr. Co. v.
George, 233 U. S. 354, 360 (1914); (d) workmen's compensation acts: Bradford Electric
Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932) ; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident
Comm. of California, 294 U. S. 532 (1935); (e) statutes governing insurance contracts
(at least by implication): Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389 (1924); Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143 (1934). The clause
also applied to a state constitution. Smithsonian Institution v. St. John, 214 U. S. 19 (1909).
14. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1935). However, the clause does not require
greater foreign effect to be given the statute than the domestic effect. Ohio v. Chattanooga
Boiler Co., 289 U. S. 439 (1933).
15. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California, 294 U. S. 532
(1935), decision in the lower court noted in (1935) 44 YA.E L. J. 869.
16. Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932) noted in (1932)
46 HARv. L. RV. 291; (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. REV. 1139; (1932) 42 YAtE L. J. 115.
17. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California, 294 U. S. 532,
550 (1935).
18. See Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts, supra note 1,
at 401 et seq.
19. Chambers v. B. & 0. Rr. Co., 207 U. S. 142 (1907); Quong Ham Wah Co., v.
Industrial Accident Comm., 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920), writ of error dismissed,
255 U. S. 445 (1921).
20. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149 (1914); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 (1918). See discussion of Dodd, supra note 2, at 548-550; and of
Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27 YAi L. 1. 656.
21. Although no case seems to have come up under the clause, the application of a state
statute to a foreign interstate carrier might be held an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce. Davis v. Farmer's Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1923). A statute as applied




a deprivation of due process as giving unwarranted extraterritorial effect to
legislative authority. - Thus, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta
Pine Land Co.,23 a statute in Mississippi declared that all contracts of insurance
entered into by Mississippi residents should be deemed to have been made under
Mississippi law. The question presented was whether the Mississippi court had
erred in applying Mississippi law to a contract between a Mississippi and a Con-
necticut company, the contract having been made in Tennessee, where both com-
panies did business. Appellant claimed that it had been denied due process and
that the Mississippi court should have given full faith and credit to the laws of
Tennessee. The Supreme Court reversed on the sole ground of due proces3,
emphasizing the point that "the interest of the forum has but slight connection
with the substance of the contract obligations."2 14 The Court's conclusion, it was
stated, rendered unnecessary any consideration of the claims made under the full
faith and credit clause. However, the clause might be important in a case where
the forum state had no relevant statute. Mlere refusal to apply the foreign
statute in such a situation would hardly be considered a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment since no statute would have been upheld. The constitutional
issue would be one purely of full faith and credit and the state decision therefore
would be reviewable only by certiorari and not by appeal.r But cases of this
kind have been rare because a state's adverse policy usually has been based on
statute, in the absence of which the foreign law is regularly enforced through
comity.2 8 Thus it may be concluded that the problem of the applicability of a
foreign statute is almost never necessarily a question of full faith and credit, but
rather one of legislative jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although, under this analysis, it becomes evident that application of the full
faith and credit clause to statutes may be narrowly limited in practice, it does
not follow that the theory determining its applicability differs from that govern-
ing its applicability to judgments. In both cases the clause, if it is applicable,
is paramount to any local policy. If the foreign court lacked personal juris-
diction, its decision is not binding and may be attacked abroad. - And as in
the case of statutes, certain judgments, although valid where rendered, may never-
theless be denied full faith and credit.2 8 Foreign adjudication of rights in
22. Cases supra note 20. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 3S9 (1924).
See (1925) 38 HAav. L. R-v. 804.
23. 292 U. S. 143 (1934), noted in (1934) 19 Sr. Louis L. Rxv. 348.
24. At 150.
25. Dodd, supra note 2, at 560-562. Professor Dodd argues that review should be dis-
cretionary so that the Supreme Court could protect itself from too many cases, and con-
sequently that full faith and credit rather than due process sbould be used. But while
the result no doubt would be desirable, an act of Congress would probably be necessary
to achieve it.
26. For example, read Northern Pacific Rr. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190 (1894).
27. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1873); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714
(1877). The effect of the due process and full faith and credit clauses on judgments in
general has been well commented on (1926) 26 CoL. L. Rnv. 464.
28. A risum6 is found in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stone in Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 213-227 (1933).
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property located in the forum state,2 9 the infliction of a prohibition or penalty,80
the determination of sanity of non-residents3 1 and sometimes the granting of
divorce 2 have thus been excepted from the clause. Just as a foreign statute
purporting to control the devolution of land in the forum state is not entitled
to extra-territorial effect by full faith and credit,3 so neither is a judicial decree
rendered under such a statute,3 4 since in either case the forum state takes pecu-
liar interest in the subject matter. While the statutes which are not entitled to
full faith and credit under the test of balancing of interests may be more numer-
ous, the basis for refusing enforcement of either judgment or statute seems iden-
tical-the existence of some practical reason approved by the Supreme Court
for denying to the foreign state the right to control the court or legislature of
the forum.
Interesting illustrations of the identity of theory in the application of the full
faith and credit clause to judgments and to statutes are available in the judicial
and legislative attempts to control the action of individuals beyond a state's
territorial limits. Thus an injunction against bringing suit in a foreign state
is not entitled to recognition there; 85 yet the parties are liable to punishment
upon their return if they go to the other state and bring suit in violation of the
injunction. 6 Likewise statutes prohibiting suit outside the state on a transi-
29. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186 (1900); Fall v. Estin, 215 U. S. 1 (1908). Con-
cerning the concepts of jurisdiction in rem and in personam, see Cook, The Jurisdiction of
Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 368.
30. Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265 (1887). A lonely case to the
contrary is Schuler v. Schuler, 209 Ill. 522, 71 N. E. 16 (1904). However, the word "penal"
has been defined so narrowly that it must approach the meaning of criminal. Huntington
v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892). See Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Govern-
ment Claims (1932) 46 HARv. L. Ray. 193. Statutory provisions are more apt to be labelled
penal. Tax statutes for example. See infra note 73. And restrictions on marriage after
divorce. Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Iowa 142, 130 N. W. 785 (1911). See RESTATEurT,
Coricr OF LAws (1934) §§ 129, 130; Beale, Marriage and the Domicile (1931) 44 HAnv.
L. REv. 501, 517. Cf. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216 (1934), noted in (1934) 48
HAgv. L. Rav. 123, lower court decision noted in (1934) 32 Micir. L. REv, 999. Recently,
however, a statute imposing exemplary damages was held not to be penal. James-Dickinson
Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119 (1927).
31. Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U. S. 16 (1918). See dissenting opinion of Justice Stone
in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 217 (1933).
32. The jurisdiction of a foreign court determining the marital status has been held
insufficient for full faith and credit purposes on the ground that the subject was inherently
domestic. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903). And although the action generally
was considered to be in rem, personal jurisdiction was required in Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U. S. 562 (1906). But see Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HaRv. L. REV. 417.
33. Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U. S. 386 (1910).
34. Hood v. McGehee, 237 U. S. 611 (1915). The length to which a court will go In
safeguarding control of devolution by the situs state is illustrated by Herzog v. Stern,
264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 597 (1934); noted in (1934)
83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 84; (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 158.
35. See Comment (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 429. And, Messner, The Jurisdiction
of a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial
Limits of the State (1930) 14 MNN. L. REV. 494.
36. A decree enjoining Massachusetts creditors from attaching property in New York
COMMENTS
tory cause of action which they create are not entitled to recognition since they
exceed legislative jurisdiction; 7 and acts purporting to penalize evasion, e.g.,
of divorce laws, by taking advantage of more lenient laws of other states need
not be enforced outside the state3 8
The actual difference in the application of the full faith and credit clause
to judgments and to statutes must be explained, then, not by different underlying
theories, but by factual differences between judgments and statutes which re-
quire different application of the same theory by reason of considerations of
practical policy. Foremost among these differences is the traditional rule that
personal service is sufficient in transitory actions to give a court jurisdiction to
determine finally existing obligations. To limit the conclusiveness of such an
adjudication to state lines would prove an insufferable restriction of res judicata.
But to hold that momentary presence of an individual within state lines is enough
to give the legislature authority over his affairs, on the other hand, would be
absurd. The result would be, in every case involving conflicting statutes when the
operative facts occurred in more states than one, that any particular state's
statute would be applicable in all the courts except its owna9 Some such limita-
tion on the extraterritorial effect of legislation as that effected by the test of
balancing of interests is manifestly necessary.40 The Supreme Court's prefer-
ence for judgments as against statutes thus seems justified. But this does not
contradict the former conclusion, or the few dicta acknowledging that when the
clause does apply it applies to the one as to the other, that the foundation for
a cause of action is not changed merely by the recovery of a judgment.4 ' The
only possible difference in such cases is one of appellate jurisdiction.4
It remains, however, to consider those acts which are entitled to full faith and
credit and some which well might be includedV3 Although the cases are few, the
was allowed by a majority of the Supreme Court to have the desired elfeet even though
judicial proceedings already were under way in New York. Cole v. Cunningham, 133
U. S. 107 (1890). The case is criticized by Langmaid, supra note 1, at 403-410.
37. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55 (1909); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.
v. George, 233 U. S. 354 (1914). Kenney v. Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U. S. 411, 415
(1920); Comment (1919) 28 YAi.E L. J. 264. See Stone, Effect of Statute Requiring Suit to
be Brought in State in whlch Cause of Action Arose (1934) 23 IL. B. J. 194.
38. See articles and editorial notes cited supra note 30.
39. See Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Comm. of California, 294 U. S. 532, 547 (1935).
40. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149, 161 (1914). The leading case
under the Fourteenth Amendment is Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897) (liberty
of contract).
41. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 292-293 (1887); Smithsonian Institution
v. St. John, 214 U. S. 19, 33 (1909). Where a judgment was based on statute, inquiry
was said to be necessary as to the applicability of the statute before determining whether
full faith and credit was to be given the judgment. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum
v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915). But see Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, 245 U. S. 412 (1917),
discussed in (1918) 13 hx. L. R v. 43.
42. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 633 (1892). Cf. Chicago & Alton Railroad
Co. v. Wiggins-Ferry Co., 108 U. S. 18, 22 (1882).
43. For an indication that a congressional act dealing with statutes may be needed, see
the dissenting opinion of Justice Stone in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 215
(1933). Despite the dictum of Chief Justice Waite, and its subrequent adoption, the fact
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opinions indicate what factors will be considered in determining when one state
will be allowed to impose its rule upon all the other states with respect to some
particular subject. The first is clearly that of convenience. If the subject mat-
ter covered by a statute falls peculiarly within the regulatory power of the enact-
ing state, its interest outweighs the interest of other states so decisively that the
policy of any other state is held to be immaterial 4  Thus in the stockholder's
liability cases,4 5 the job of collecting if the receiver were required to serve and
bring suit against each individual stockholder wherever located, would have been
not only expensive but well-nigh impossible," whereas by giving full faith and
credit to the statute of the state of incorporation, the liability could be determined
by a single action in that one state. Similar considerations justified extension of
the clause to cover the charters and laws of fraternal organizations seeking
to collect special assessments froln members. 7 In extending full faith and credit
to these subjects, the Supreme Court emphasized the element common to both
of a continuing relation which, while statutory in origin, was said to be "con-
tractual in nature." 48 The liability was held to be an incident of the incorpora-
tion and therefore to be governed by the laws of the incorporating state. But
the soundness of this technical argument has been seriously questioned on the
ground that to imply a contract is to rely on fiction. 0 In a recent Supreme
Court decision involving the liability of stockholders of the Bank of the United
States, factors of convenience seem to have been decisive.0 If the contractual
argument alone could suffice, it is difficult to see why numerous other statutes
imposing duties in relations assumed voluntarily are not entitled to foreign
enforcement under the clause.51 And certainly the argument does not explain
the Court's recent application of the clause to workmen's compensation acts,62
that Congress has not spoken of statutes, as it has of judicial proceedings, has been suggested
as a reason for the different treatment; Field, supra note 1, at 451-454. As to the power
of Congress, see Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
(1919) 28 YALE L. J. 421. It is suggested that this power may be broad enough to enable
Congress to prescribe standards to which state legislation must conform. Corwin, supra
note 5, at 388.
44. Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 260 (1912).
45. Converse v. Hamilton; Broderick v. Rosner, both supra note 13; Bernheimer v.
Converse, 206 U. S. 516 (1907) ; Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U. S. 652 (1913) ; Marn v. Augedahl,
247 U. S. 142 (1918). Cf. Hale v. Allison, 188 U. S. 56 (1903); Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S.
335 (1903).
46. In Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 640 (1935) the cost would have exceeded
the assessment. (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 707, 708.
47. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green; Modern Woodmen of America
v. Mixer, both supra note 13.
48. (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 707, 708, cases cited n. 8. The editor suggests that the term
is used to demonstrate that the action is transitory, and that, being voluntary, the obligation
is to be distinguished from a penalty.
49. (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 707, 708-710.
50. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1935).
51. Ordinary receivership statutes, for example. Neither have factors of convenience
been enough there. See infra notes 80-82.
52. Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc., v. Clapper; Alaska Packers Asn. v. Industrial
Accident Comm. of California, both supra note 13.
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many of which expressly state that the obligation is independent of contract.Ps
If the argument were controlling, the result in such cases would be that the act
of the state where the employment contract was made, or the act of some other
state designated in the contract, would be applicable regardless of the place of
injury, of the employee's domicile or of regular employment-a conclusion which
no case under the clause supports, least of all the Court's most recent word,
which affirms the test of interest. 4 Rather, just as in the case of the statutes
providing for liability of stockholders and members of fraternal organizations,
factors of convenience, saving, and certainty seem to have induced the Supreme
Court to extend the clause to workmen's compensation acts,55 a field character-
ized by endless and expensive litigation, the possibility of double recovery, or
of none.56 Formerly, if the action were brought in the state of injury its law
could be applied even though the plaintiff lived, usually worked, and had signed
the employment contract in a sister state. Often the two acts would be different
as to the amounts recoverable, or one might allow a common-law remedy. If the
first recovery were less than could be had in the sister state, a second suit could
be brought and an award of the difference, occasionally of the whole amount,
could be recovered.5 7 Nor has the application of full faith and credit yet re-
duced the field to certainty. The interests involved are more complex and more
capable of even balance than in the case of stockholders' liability, and conse-
quently it may not be said that exclusive effect must always be given the law of a
single ascertained state.58 Thus various factors of applicability were considered
in the two Supreme Court decisions, 9 Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper
and Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California. Although
the same results could have been reached in those cases by a simple statement
that the law of the place of the employment contract must prevail, such a rule
might work great hardship in a case where, for example, unless the act of the
state of the employee's residence were applied, both he and his dependents would
become public charges. 0 But while the interest test may be difficult at first, the
Court by deciding a relatively small number of standard everyday set-ups may
53. See Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws (1927) 11 ,1un. L.
Rxv. 329, 352.
54. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California, 294 U. S. 5323
542, 549-550.
55. Adequate discussions of the first case, Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc., v. Clapp-.r,
286 U. S. 145 (1932), are given in (1932) 46 HARv. L. Rnv. 291; (1932) 42 YI.u L. 1. 115.
56. Dwan, supra note 53.
57. Angell, Recovery Under Workmen's Compensation Acts for Injury Abroad (1918)
31 HARv. L. REv. 619. See Anderson v. Jarrett Chambers Co., Inc., 210 App. Div. 543, 206
N. Y. Supp. 458 (3d Dep't, 1924). (1925) 10 Cons. L. Q. 364.
58. Thus in the Alaska Packers case, supra note 13, although the court decided that
California had the greater interest, (p. 525), it was not willing to say that recovery could
not have been had in Alaska. In fact the implication wras that it could. (p. 520). In
Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, supra note 41, it was intimated that Illinois could have
applied the statute of either state if suit had been commenced there.
59. .Supra note 13.
60. As, for instance, in United States Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 77 F. (2d) 542, 546
(App. D. C. 1935). Comment (1935) 49 HARv. L. Rav. 146.
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establish examples which will result ultimately in reasonable uniformity0 ' and
certainty of lower court treatment.
The workmen's compensation cases probably indicate the manner in which the
clause will be applied to statutes in the general fields of torts and contracts.
Since the Court is unwilling to hold that the law of the place of injury or of
contract always is to govern, 2 and since the Court would be swamped if it
were to acknowledge a constitutional issue in every such case, it is safe to say
that compulsion on the forum state to give full faith and credit to foreign statutes
in conflict with its own will be limited cautiously, as in the past, to particular
types of statutes covering subject matter of recurring dispute. In the tort field
there are the wrongful death statutes. While the statute of the state of injury is
generally applied, in some cases the legislative jurisdiction of the state of the
act causing the injury, or of the state of death, has been upheld.03 Certainty
might be promoted if the Supreme Court, as with workmen's compensation, would
provide decisions in a few typical situations. And clearly desirable would be
decisions finally determining the crucial questions repeatedly arising of whether
time limitations, limitations on the amount of recovery and on the capacity to
sue, are substantive or merely procedural, and likewise whether for purposes
of fill faith and credit the cause of action is to be considered penal. A second
group of statutes to which the clause might be extended are those imposing lia-
bility on non-resident car owners for their bailee's acts within the state. Such
legislative jurisdiction was upheld in Young v. Masci,'4 as against the owner's
contention that his liberty of contract was unconstitutionally impaired and that
the foreign act could not apply to him consistently with due process. Although
the full faith and credit clause was not involved, inasmuch as the New Jersey
court had applied the New York law by comity, on the basis of the previous
analysis the question may b'e deemed to have been answered, for the interest of
New York in the subject matter which gives it legislative jurisdiction would
probably also be considered superior under the test of balancing of interests.
However, it seems inadvisable to bring under the clause, without restriction as
to subject matter, tort statutes in general, such as those dealing with the effect
of contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule, survival of actions, and abso-
lute liability. Not only would the Court be flooded, but in view of the multi-
tudinous possible factual variations, the ends of convenience, certainty and uni-
formity scarcely could be served.
61. The desirability of uniformity in the general conflict field, however, has been subject
to professorial debate. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws (1927) 37
YALE L. J. 468, 480-482. Cf. Beach, supra note 20, at 662; Langmaid, supra note 1, at
420-421; Lorenzen, "supra note 6, at 751.
62. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (1909) 23 Htav. L. Rv. 1,
79, 194, 260.
63. Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, 33 Micir. L. R v. 545
(1935).
64. 289 U. S. 253 (1933), noted in (1933) 47 HARv. L. Rav. 349; Beale, Two Cases on
Jurisdiction (1935) 48 HAIfv. L. REV. 620. Cf. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co.,
108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928); (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 210; 42 HAv. L. REV. 433




The same reasoning would obtain in the field of contracts, and it is to be ex-
pected that the clause will be applicable only according to subject matter.
Statutes governing insurance contracts appear to be eligible. Although the
Supreme Court has seen fit to deal with them on the basis of due process and
liberty of contract rather than of full faith and credit, as in the Hartford Acci-
dent case,23 there does not seem to have been occasion to rely on the clause.
But in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Headra the Court specifically stated,cO as
argued above, that the principle of legislative jurisdiction "lies at the founda-
tion of the full faith and credit clause." Thus it seems clear that if a case
should arise in which the forum state had no statute, yet refused to apply the
applicable foreign statute, the Supreme Court would use the clause to compel
enforcement. It is possible, however, that a different practical result might
be reached if, instead of refusing to apply the foreign statute, the forum were
to misinterpret it, since innumerable cases support the view that a misconstruc-
tion is not a denial of full faith and credit entitling the parties to review.cr
While such holdings seem in conflict with the opinion expressed by justice
Holmes for the court in Modern Woodmen of America v. MixerG9 that full faith
and credit should be given not merely to the statute but also to the state decisions
construing the statute, nevertheless the Court, perhaps mindful that to adopt
such a rule would be to render the clause applicable even to foreign interpreta-
tions of uniform state statutes such as the Negotiable Instruments Law cO has
been non-committal.
In addition to insurance, marriage relations would seem to afford an appro-
priate subject matter for the application of the full faith and credit clause to
statutes.7 ° Here again are the standard, recurring types of situation, the need
for reform, the desire for certainty, and here too is the continuing relation be-
tween the parties, contractual in nature, that appealed to the court in the stock-
holders and fraternal organization members cases. But undoubtedly if the
clause were to be extended to statutes governing the matrimonial status and
divorce, the court would be unwilling to overthrow history by declaring that
the state of celebration, or of residence, alone had jurisdiction, as was true
of the state of incorporation. Rather the interests of the states concerned would
65. 234 U. S. 149 (1914) (loan arising out of insurance contract).
66. At 161.
67. Banholzer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 178 U. S. 402 (1900); Pennsylvania Fire
Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining and Mlilling Co., 243 U. S. 93, 96-97 (1917).
The early notion was that otherwise the Supreme Court's jurisdiction would be enlarged
as never contemplated. Glenn v. Garth, 147 U. S. 360 (1S93) (no conflicting decizions
involved).
68. 267 U. S. 544 (1925). See Langmaid, supra note 1, at 400. See also Hartford Life
Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U. S. 146, 150 (1917); Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112 (1934).
69. LoaxzmN, THE Courncr oP LAWs RErNTG To Bn.rs Am NoTEs (1919).
70. See Beale, supra note 32; Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce
(1906) 19 HAnv. L. REv. 586; Jones, Conflict of Laws in Divorce Cases (1934) 10 No=
DA-A L. 11. Alimony decrees are entitled to full faith and credit as to p3st-due inztall-
ments: Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1910). See (1934) 11 N. Y. L. Q. Rxv. 634. But




be appraised, following the workmen's compensation pattern. Thus, in the recent
case of Yarborough v. Yarborough,71 where full faith and credit was given to
a divorce settlement, the question at issue was whether in view of the wife's and
child's removal to the forum state the interest of the divorce state was sufficient
to entitle its judicial decree to full faith and credit, the implication of the
discussion, if not of the holding, being that jurisdiction might shift with a shift
in the state where the consequence would be" felt. If the interest test thus
determines whether full faith and credit is to be given a judicial proceeding,
it would be no less appropriate with respect to a statute.
Still another field for entrance is taxation. Up to the present, despite the
need for means of extraterritorial enforcement, the policy of one state not to
enforce the revenue laws of another state has been upheld, 72 for it is argued
that taxes should be treated no better than penalties.7 3 But recent state deci-
sions indicate that a foreign tax no longer should be denied enforcement on
the ground that it amounts to a penalty.74 Thus in People v. Coe Manufacturing
Co. 75 the New Jersey Court enforced a New York tax claim that had been
reduced to judgment. The opinion was based on the ground that full faith
and credit was being given to the judgment rather than to the tax. But it is
plain that if the tax had been considered a penalty the clause would not have
required any more effect to be given the judgment than the statute, since it is
well established that penal judgments likewise fall without the mandate.80 If
the clause is to be available as a method of foreign collection, there would
seem to be no excuse in practice or theory for the necessity of a judgment,
entailing as it does expense, waste, and difficulty. In the instance of a tax
involving peculiar burdens of computation the foreign court might protect itself
from abuse by extending the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 70 or full faith
and credit to the tax statute might be refused on the ground that right and
remedy were inextricably mingled."7
Notwithstanding these considerations, extension of the clause to taxes and
71. 290 U. S. 202 (1933), noted in (1934) 34 CoL. L. R V. 164; (1934) 47 HARv. L.
REv. 712; (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 648.
72. Perhaps the leading case is Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921).
Leflar, supra note 30.
73. See the concurring opinion of Learned Hand, J., in Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d)
600 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), aff'd, 281 U. S. 18 (1930). The Supreme Court (p, 24) found It
unnecessary to decide whether a federal court in one state will enforce the revenue laws
of another state.
74. For the view that taxes should be treated as debts, see Comment (1929) 29 COL.
L. Rxv. 782.
75. 10 N. J. Misc. 1162, 162 Atl. 872 (1932), noted in (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 581; (1933)
42 YArF L. J. 1131. Hazlewood, Full Faith and Credit Clause as Applied to Enforcement
of Tax Judgments (1934) 19 MARQ. L. Rav. 10.
76. The doctrine has been discussed recently. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens in Anglo-American Law (1929) 29 CoL. L. Ray. 11; (1928) 41 Hav. L. REV. 387.
Comment (1935) 33 MIcn. L. Rv. 398. As to the limitations on the power of a state
to control the jurisdiction of its courts, see Comment (1934) 34 COL. L. REV. 1116.




other suggested matters78 is by no means imminent, if, indeed, it will ever occur.
The Supreme Court's final unwillingness, after apparent hesitation,"0 to abandon
an old rule was illustrated this year in Clark v. Williard,80 holding that although
the clause required the courts of Montana to recognize an Iowa receiver as a
statutory receiver, it did not require them to enforce his rights as against
Montana creditors of an Iowa corporation with local assets. This adherence
to Booth v. Clark8l was made unanimously in the face of arguments of amid
curiae showing that extension of the clause to receivership law would result
in great saving and convenience, that close precedent was afforded by the stock-
holder's liability cases, and that modern conditions required a scrapping of
older doctrine.8 2 The Court might have chosen to rely upon the fact of local
assets in Montana giving Montana a superior interest and precluding Iowa
from having sole jurisdiction, yet the opinion is not rested on that ground, and
the conclusion must be that history prevailed. The case clearly indicates that
the present trend towards supplanting comity with compulsion is to be one of
gradual, deliberate development.
78. Such as contractual aspects to the sale of land, mortgages and conditional --ales,
wIls, arbitration agreements, etc. There appear to be no cases in which the clause has
been applied to arbitration agreements as judgments. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration-
Enforcement of Foreign Awards (1935) 45 Yra. L. J. 39, 56.
79. Clark v. W'flliard, 292 U. S. 112 (1934) ; (1935) 48 HARv. L. RLv. 835.
80. Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935).
81. 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854). Rose, Extraterritorial Actions by Recevers (1933) 17
,£m. L. Rv. 704.
82. Compare Heilman, Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Confli t of Laws
(1934) 43 YAxx L. J. 1082.
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